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Over the last century, countless pages have been filled by
advocates and academics, courts and commentators, all offering
insights and suggested improvements for juvenile justice in the
United States. 1 In recent years, one practice in particular has drawn
increased attention and criticism—transferring youth from our
nation’s juvenile system into criminal courts for adult prosecution
and prison sentences. 2
Numerous voices have joined the movement to challenge the
imposition of lengthy adult prison terms for kids convicted of serious
crimes. Given their special vulnerabilities and the need for treatment
rather than punishment, critics argue that young felony offenders
should have their cases handled in our country’s specialized juvenile
courts, where they might receive age-appropriate interventions
intended to support redirection and healthy development. 3

1. Many advocates and experts have taken on issues like the overuse of pre-trial
detention in juvenile courts and conditions of confinement in juvenile detention centers. See,
e.g., SARAH ALICE BROWN, TRENDS IN JUVENILE JUSTICE STATE LEGISLATION: 2011-2015
(2015), http://www.modelsforchange.net/publications/783; ANNIE BALCK, ADVANCES IN
JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM: 2009-2011 (2012), http://www.njjn.org/uploads/digitallibrary/NJJN_adv_fin_press_sept_update.pdf; BARRY HOLMAN & JASON ZIEDENBERG,
JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, THE DANGERS OF DETENTION: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATING
YOUTH
IN
DETENTION
AND
OTHER
SECURE
FACILITIES
(2013),
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/06-11_rep_dangersofdetention_jj.pdf;
BILL
RUST, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., JUVENILE JAILHOUSE ROCKED: REFORMING DETENTION IN
CHICAGO, PORTLAND, AND SACRAMENTO (1999), http://www.aecf.org/resources/juvenilejailhouse-rocked-reforming-detention-in-chicago-portland-and-sacra/; James Austin et al.,
Alternatives to the Secure Detention and Confinement of Juvenile Offenders, OJJDP JUVENILE
JUSTICE BULL. (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, D.C.), Sept. 2005, http://www.networkofcare.org/
library/alternativestoyouthdetention.pdf. These efforts have resulted in the reform of juvenile
detention practices across the country.
2. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. BUTTS, RESEARCH AND EVALUATION DATABITS, TRANSFER OF
JUVENILES TO CRIMINAL COURT IS NOT CORRELATED WITH FALLING YOUTH VIOLENCE
(2012),
http://johnjayresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/databit2012_05.pdf;
Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Transfer Laws: An Effective Deterrent to Delinquency?, OJJDP
JUVENILE JUSTICE BULL. (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, D.C.), Aug. 2008, http://www.cclp.org/
documents/Alternatives/Juvenile%20Transfer%20Laws%20OJJDP.pdf.
3. See, e.g., ESTIVALIZ CASTRO ET AL., CAL. ALL., TREAT KIDS AS KIDS: WHY YOUTH
SHOULD BE KEPT IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (2014), http://jjustice.org/wordpress/
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Interestingly, these conversations have almost entirely overlooked
another set of important legal venues and their juvenile justice
implications—those adjudicating low-level offenses such as local
traffic and ordinance violations. There has been little scholarly,
judicial, or advocacy address of the almost underground
phenomenon of prosecuting minors in municipal courts.
This Essay calls for greater attention to the issue. It does so in
the wake of recent events in Ferguson, Missouri. As covered by
national and international news, residents of Ferguson—along with
allies across the region, country, and globe—protested the shooting
death of Michael Brown, an unarmed Black teenager, who was killed
in August 2014 by white municipal police officer, Darren Wilson.4
Not only did this event spark calls for Officer Wilson’s arrest, police
reforms, and racial justice more generally, 5 but somewhat remarkably,
it also generated wide-spread agreement that local courts needed to
change the way they process, prosecute, and punish low-level
ordinance violations. 6
Indeed, as the nation has now discovered, in part due to the
Department of Justice’s investigation of the Ferguson police and
wp-content/uploads/CAYCJ-treat-kids-as-kids-Oct-2014.pdf; DANIELLE MOLE & DODD
WHITE, TRANSFER AND WAIVER IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 24 (2005) (noting
“Juveniles who are transferred to the adult criminal justice system have poorer outcomes than
comparable youth sentenced in the juvenile court system”) http://66.227.70.18/programs/
juvenilejustice/jjtransfer.pdf; Marsha Levick, As Another Young Boy Commits Suicide in an
Adult Prison, We Must Rethink the Prosecution of Children as Adults, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG
(Nov. 23, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marsha-levick/as-another-young-boycomm_b_5862590.html.
4. See, e.g., Sara Sidner, Activist Cornel West among 49 People Arrested at Ferguson
Protests, CNN (Oct. 13, 2014, 8:47 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/13/us/fergusonprotests/; Ferguson Unrest: From Shooting to Nationwide Protests, BBC NEWS (Aug. 10, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-30193354.
5. See, e.g., Jamelle Bouie, Why the Fires in Ferguson Won’t End Soon, SLATE (Aug. 19,
2014, 6:42 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/08/
ferguson_protests_over_michael_brown_won_t_end_soon_the_black_community.html (“The
tensions have been building for a long time, and even justice for Michael Brown won’t change
that.”); Daniel Wallis & Edward McAllister, Ferguson Demonstrators Begin 120-Mile March to
Missouri State Capital, REUTERS (Nov. 29, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usamissouri-shooting-idUSKCN0J80PR20141129 (reporting one racial justice march participant
noted: “This isn’t just about St. Louis. We are speaking for other cities, other countries, too”).
6. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Mann, Cries for Reform in Traffic Courts Grow Louder in Wake
LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH
(Sept.
5,
2014,
11:30
PM),
of
Ferguson,
ST.
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/cries-for-reform-in-traffic-courtsgrow-louder-in-wake/article_0295f598-7421-515a-8c52-337a36b7cc71.html.
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court system, 7 the aggressive pursuit of fines and court fees through
traffic cases and related quality-of-life actions has been one of the
most troubling aspects of life for many St. Louis, Missouri residents.8
But the experiences of juveniles—youth under the age of eighteen—
have received much less attention in the course of these critiques and
calls for municipal court reform.
Yet in some places, like Ferguson, young people, considered
juveniles by United States Supreme Court standards, face automatic
municipal court prosecution without any prior certification hearing
or specialized legal protections. 9
This Article suggests we draw lessons from Ferguson and work
proactively to improve local municipal court practices across the
country in the days ahead. In particular, we should redirect young
people from municipal dockets largely focused on enhancing local
finances, to age-appropriate, specialized juvenile courts intended to
support youth. There, minor conflicts with the law should be
resolved informally as an acknowledgment that kids will—and
should—be kids.
This Article will proceed in four parts. Part I describes the ways
in which most people conceive of youth contact with the justice
system—either through juvenile or criminal courts. It begins by
discussing juvenile courts, outlining their history and goals, as well as
the rights they must provide to youth. It also notes that while legal
7. U.S. DEPT. JUST., C.R. DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf.
8. See Radley Balko, How Municipalities in St. Louis County, Mo., Profit from Poverty,
WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/
2014/09/03/how-st-louis-county-missouri-profits-from-poverty/;
Conor
Friedersdorf,
Ferguson’s Conspiracy Against Black Citizens, ATLANTIC (Mar. 5, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/03/ferguson-as-a-criminal-conspiracyagainst-its-black-residents-michael-brown-department-of-justice-report/386887/ (“Ferguson
officials repeatedly behaved as if their priority is not improving public safety or protecting the
rights of residents, but maximizing the revenue that flows into city coffers.”).
9. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 211.021(2) (2010) (defining child generally for
purposes of juvenile delinquency prosecution as anyone under the age of 17, thereby allowing
all 17 year olds to be directly filed into the municipal and criminal court systems); MO. REV.
STAT. § 211.031.1(2) & (3) (2015) (carving further out an exception for 15 and 16 year olds,
allowing municipal courts to prosecute them for traffic, curfew, and tobacco offenses), compare
with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding, in a Missouri case, that anyone under
the age of eighteen is considered a juvenile against whom a death sentence may not be
imposed under the Eighth Amendment).
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protections within these institutions are constitutionally required—
juvenile courts themselves are not. That is, at least to date, appellate
courts have declined to find that children in conflict with the law
have a constitutional right to juvenile courts as venues of first resort.
Part I continues with a discussion of the long-standing practice
of excluding some youth from juvenile courts, prosecuting them in
criminal courts, and sentencing them as adults. It also summarizes a
growing body of literature and wave of advocacy that calls for an end
to harsh adult prison terms for youth. This work focuses largely on
lengthy sentences for homicides and other serious crimes.
It further describes one significant result of this movement—the
emergence of enhanced constitutional rights and protections at
criminal sentencing proceedings for youth under the age of eighteen.
Such substantive changes and safeguards are largely rooted in
modern adolescent development teachings. Yet these critiques and
remedies have almost entirely ignored a third kind of court that
impacts kids—local municipal courts.
Part II provides an overview of United States municipal courts,
using St. Louis County’s ninety municipalities generally, and the
Ferguson Municipal Court in particular, as a lens. Part III then sheds
light on contemporary local practices for kids in municipal courts, in
Ferguson and around the country, that undermine state and federal
juvenile justice laws and policies that see youth as different from
adult offenders.
Part IV suggests that we draw insights from efforts to protect
juveniles in the most serious cases and apply them to minor
municipal court matters. First, common sense suggests most kids
belong in courts created for kids. While public shaming and
punishing poverty are unacceptable practices for adults, they are even
more unconscionable when visited upon children. Thus, referring
youth to child-centered confidential juvenile courts rather than
municipal courts comports with contemporary and historic concerns
about young people and their special needs.
Second, it explains that deploying localized punitive practices
against children amounts to what I refer to as “in loco juvenile
justice,” which displaces both state and federal standards intended to
protect youth. Like traditional in loco parentis doctrine, where the
state steps into the role of parent for the child, municipalities seem
to be attempting to step into the role of the state vis a vis juveniles
and juvenile justice. The Latin term in loco also captures the
1251
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localized, place-specific nature of municipalities and their courts.
Finally, the phrase evokes the feeling of irrationality presented by
municipal courts serving as a shadow juvenile justice system,
undermining the goals and intentions of state and federal youth laws
and policies.
For instance, state contract doctrines preclude adults from
collecting debts from kids. And federal law generally prohibits
detaining juveniles based on status offenses or jailing them with
adults for any alleged wrongdoing. Ordering children to satisfy court
fines or face the possibility of liberty deprivation for minor youthful
indiscretions is not only inconsistent with such federal policies, but
potentially preempted on state law grounds.
Emerging standards around youth sentencing and justice in
serious felony matters provide further powerful support for a
constitutional right to juvenile court treatment. While such a right
has not been recognized to date, this Article argues the Supreme
Court’s evolving standards for youth—cases from the last decade,
Roper v. Simmons, 10 Graham v. Florida, 11 Miller v. Alabama, 12 and In
re JDB 13—may finally provide firm footing for such a claim.
Thus, the Ferguson crisis should be seen as an opportunity to
embrace more humane practices when dealing with kids in conflict
with the law—even for low-level local ordinance violations. Policing
and prosecuting youth should involve age-appropriate interactions
and interventions, with juvenile courts serving as the default legal
venue. Current events demonstrate that in loco juvenile justice
practices—localized efforts that displace state, federal, and
constitutional youth laws and policies—are no longer invisible
or appropriate.

10.
11.
12.
13.

1252

543 U.S. 551 (2005).
560 U.S. 48 (2010).
132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
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I. KIDS IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW: THE JUVENILE VERSUS
CRIMINAL COURT STORY
The United States maintains a conflicted conception of youth
when it comes to courts, crimes, and case processing. 14 On one hand,
our state justice systems have developed countless child-centered
venues called juvenile courts, where youth are processed when they
allegedly break the law. 15 And the United States Supreme Court has
provided basic due process protections to kids who face prosecution
in these courts. 16
On the other hand, in some instances we frame kids and their
alleged crimes as so non-childlike that we prosecute them in our
state criminal court systems and punish them as adults. 17 In fact,
some jurisdictions go so far as to sentence children to die behind
bars with life without the possibility of parole as their prison term. 18
However, in the case of the latter, the Supreme Court recently
announced the need to constitutionally temper such actions in light
of modern scientific understandings of adolescence. 19
While seemingly disconnected, when taken together, these two
frameworks—affirmative juvenile court requirements and criminal
court restrictions—may offer some fundamental principles for the
future of dealing with youth in conflict with the law. 20
A. Development and Deployment of Specialized Juvenile Courts
United States juvenile courts have a complex and somewhat
cyclical history. 21 With the development of the first juvenile court in

14. See MARK LIPSEY ET AL., IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
PROGRAMS: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES 5 (Georgetown Ctr. for
Juvenile Justice Reform, ed. 2010) (“Juvenile justice systems in the United States have long
struggled with the inherent tension between their role in meting out punishment . . . [and]
bringing about constructive behavior change.”).
15. See infra Section I.A.
16. See infra Section I.A.
17. See infra Section I.B.
18. See infra Section I.B.
19. See infra Section I.C.
20. See infra Section I.C.
21. This is an account that is still very much being written, as formerly overlooked
narratives and experiences, including those of youth of color, are finally being added to legal
history’s annals. See, e.g., CHERYL D. HICKS, TALK WITH YOU LIKE A WOMAN: AFRICAN

1253

QUINN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

4/5/2016 2:13 PM

2015

1899 in Chicago, Illinois, the nation started down a path of
embracing specialized venues for prosecuting kids accused of
wrongdoing. 22 Without any mandate from the United States
Supreme Court, and over numerous constitutional challenges to the
creation of such institutions, 23 the juvenile court model spread across
the country during the 1910s and the 1920s. 24 By the middle of the
last century, every jurisdiction had developed its own juvenile court
system and juvenile code. 25
Our country’s juvenile courts were founded on the idea of in loco
parentis, where the state sought to stand in the shoes of the child’s
parent. 26 From the outset, its architects sought to create a nonpunitive forum with less formal legal practices geared towards the

AMERICAN WOMEN, JUSTICE, AND REFORM IN NEW YORK, 1890-1935 (Thadious M. Davis &
Mary Kelley eds., 2010); Cheryl Nelson Butler, Blackness as Delinquency, 90 WASH. U. L. REV.
1335 (2013); see generally Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22
STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970) (challenging traditional historical accounts of juvenile courts and
noting their implications).
22. ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY
138–39 (40th anniversary ed. 2009) (describing the passage of the 1899 Illinois Juvenile
Court Act and beginning of the nation’s juvenile court movement); Mae C. Quinn, Access to
Justice: Evolving Standards in Juvenile Justice: From Gault to Graham and Beyond, 38 WASH. U.
J. L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2012) (noting the first juvenile justice movement in this country began at
the turn of the last century).
23. See, e.g., Ex parte Daedler, 228 P. 467, 471 (Cal. 1924) (“[I]t may be stated that
the almost universal trend of modern cases is in the direction of upholding the constitutionality
of juvenile court laws as against assaults upon their validity.”); Piland v. Clark County Juvenile
Court Services, 457 P.2d 523, 523 (Nev. 1969) (“The constitutionality of Juvenile Court laws
has been sustained in over 40 jurisdictions against a variety of attacks.”); see also Emma O.
Lundberg, The Juvenile Court as a Constructive Social Agency, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL WORK 155, 155 (1922) (“The past few years have
witnessed in some quarters considerable opposition to the work of the juvenile court.”).
24. PLATT, supra note 22, at 139; see also Emma O. Lundberg, Juvenile Courts—
Present and Future, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONGRESS OF THE AMERICAN PRISON
ASSOCIATION 48, 48 (1921) (“Although every State but two has legislation authorizing the
establishment of special juvenile courts or juvenile sessions, the juvenile court movement is still
in a relatively primitive stage.”).
25. PLATT, supra note 22, at 139 (“By 1928, all but two states had adopted a juvenile
court system.”); Quinn, supra note 22, at 3 (“[T]reatment intervention through informality
took hold in juvenile courts during the first half of the last century.”).
26. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967) (describing in loco parentis as the “power of the
state to act . . . for the purpose of protecting the property interests and the person of
the child”).
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needs of young people. 27 For instance, they reportedly wished to
remove kids from the public spectacle of the criminal courtroom and
focus on rehabilitation over retribution. 28
Today, while every state has its own individual juvenile code and
juvenile court structure, all generally consider the special interests of
children who appear before them. 29 For instance, juvenile courts
assume that youth are still minors who have family and community
connections. 30 Parents and guardians are actual parties to
proceedings where custody and other familial implications may be
considered. 31 In addition, most juvenile courts continue to provide
some form of confidentiality and protection from the stigma of
formal public findings. 32 The vast majority of formally adjudicated

27. Kristin Henning, Juvenile Justice After Graham v. Florida: Keeping Due Process,
Autonomy, and Paternalism in Balance, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 17, 19–20 (2012)
(describing the protective intuitions that drove the establishment of separate juvenile courts);
see also PLATT, supra note 22, at 142–43 (noting how at the outset juvenile court judges were
framed as “therapist[s]” working to understand and save children, rather than punish them).
28. Christopher Slobogin, Treating Juveniles Like Juveniles: Getting Rid of Transfer and
Expanded Adult Court Jurisdiction, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 103, 124 (2013) (“Given the
traditional rehabilitative focus of the juvenile court, it stands to reason that the juvenile court
system will have more to offer than the adult system in terms of treatment.”); see also PLATT,
supra note 22, at 145 (“The passage of the Illinois juvenile court act in 1899 prompted a flood
of optimistic rhetoric from child-saving organizations.”).
29. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-302 (1989) (requiring consideration of best
interest of the juvenile before placement in state custody); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-100(5)
(1979) (“[T]he best interests of the juvenile are of paramount consideration by the court.”);
WIS. STAT. § 938.01(2)(f) (1995) (stating the purposes of Wisconsin Juvenile Code include
responding to the best interest of the juvenile).
30. Kristin Henning, It Takes a Lawyer to Raise a Child?: Allocating Responsibilities
among Parents, Children, and Lawyers in Delinquency Cases, 6 NEV. L.J. 836, 839 (2006)
(“Parental involvement is generally indispensable in the rehabilitative mission of the [juvenile]
court and is often essential in helping children communicate with lawyers, make critical legal
decisions, and achieve stated objectives in the juvenile case.”).
31. See id.; see also, e.g., Common Questions About Juvenile Courts, ALA. COURT,
http://juv.alacourt.gov/Cases/question.aspx (last visited Nov. 14, 2015) (“Parents or
guardians of a child may be made parties in all juvenile court actions, which means that a
parent or guardian may be required to pay attorney fees, fines, court costs, restitution and
other costs and/or carry out certain activities which the court deems is in the best interest of
the child . . . .”).
32. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.340(1)(a) (1986) (stating juvenile court
records generally “shall be deemed confidential and shall not be disclosed” except to interested
parties or for upon court order good cause); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2108 (2015) (describing
which juvenile court records are open to public inspection and which are to be maintained in
confidence); cf. Kristin Henning, Eroding Confidentiality in Delinquency Proceedings: Should
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cases result in youth receiving treatment through social services,
probation, and special youth placements, rather than fines, jail, or
prison. 33 And frequently they are informally resolved by way of
youth-centered diversionary programs and practices, including
warnings and dismissal. 34
Many have argued that juvenile courts are too informal and often
entangle youth in a net of state control. 35 The United States
Supreme Court embraced such critiques when it declared in 1967
that paternalism should not be used to justify arbitrariness or a lack
of process in juvenile proceedings. 36 Handing down In re Gault, the
Supreme Court announced a right to representation, against selfincrimination, and a baseline of notice and due process formality for
youth-centered proceedings. 37 Despite recognizing its failings and
the need to strike a balance relating to state in loco parentis practices,
the Court embraced the juvenile court model and acknowledged
benefits to prosecuting kids outside of the adult criminal courts. 38

Schools and Public Housing Authorities Be Notified?, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520 (2004) (noting the
various expanding exceptions to juvenile court confidentiality principles).
33. See Tamar R. Birckhead, Delinquent by Reason of Poverty, 38 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 53, 58 (2012) (noting that of 1.7 million juvenile court cases processed in 2008, over
900,000 resulted in either informal adjustment services or formal supervision through
probation). While some state juvenile courts may impose fines as part of case disposition, many
states prohibit fines for children. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 211.181 (2005) (providing order
for disposition or treatment); JOY COOK CARMICHAEL ET AL. 25 FLA. JUR. 2D FAMILY LAW §
422 (2015) (“A trial court . . . has no power to impose a fine on a juvenile in a delinquency
proceeding, or allow for imposition of only nominal fines.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1131(5) (2014) (providing maximum fine of $50 for law violation). In addition, a parent or
guardian is usually a party to such cases. See, e.g., E. BAY CMTY. LAW CTR., FINANCIAL COSTS
FOR YOUTH AND THEIR FAMILIES IN THE ALAMEDA COUNTY JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: A
GUIDE FOR ADVOCATES (2013), http://www.researchgate.net/publication/272242330.
34. See MODELS FOR CHANGE, JUVENILE DIVERSION GUIDEBOOK (2011),
http://www.modelsforchange.net/publications/301.
35. See, e.g., Barbara Fedders, Losing the Guiding Hand: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
in Juvenile Delinquency Representation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 771, 784 (2010); Robin
Walker Sterling, Fundamental Unfairness: In Re Gault and the Road Not Taken, 72 MD. L.
REV. 607, 614–15 (2013); see also Birckhead, supra note 33, at 81 (describing phenomenon of
adjudicating youth not based on culpability but perceived need).
36. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
37. Id. at 34; see also Mae C. Quinn, Giving Kids Their Due: Theorizing a Modern
Fourteenth Amendment Framework for Juvenile Defense Representation, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2185,
2190–91 (2014).
38. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 79; see also Walker, supra note 35, at 643.
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In offering this middle ground, many believe Gault did not go
far enough in protecting kids, particularly youth of color who are
vastly overrepresented in juvenile courts and corrections centers
today. 39 Many juvenile court systems currently face scrutiny for
problematic practices. 40 Despite these problems, few juvenile justice
experts call for the abolition of juvenile courts. 41 While such
sentiments were shared by some stakeholders decades ago, 42 today
almost all youth advocates agree that it is preferable to have juveniles
prosecuted in the juvenile court system rather than criminal courts,
given the harsh sentencing alternatives and other stigmas kids face
when prosecuted as adults. 43
Yet, as described further below, many youth in the United States
are excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction each year. Serious
youthful offender cases are frequently prosecuted in adult criminal
courts and end with harsh prison terms. 44
B. Continued Practice of Prosecuting Kids in Criminal Courts
Although the turn of the last century marked the beginning of
the juvenile court movement, it did not end the practice of
prosecuting kids in adult courts. Even after the Chicago Juvenile
39. See, e.g., Fedders, supra note 35, at 784; Sterling, supra note 35, at 614–15.
40. In fact, as this paper goes to press, Saint Louis County’s Family Court is
contending with findings by the United States Department of Justice, alleging the court
system fails to adequately protect the right to counsel, due process of law, or equal protection
of the laws. See U.S. DEPT. JUST. C.R. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE ST. LOUIS COUNTY
FAMILY COURT, ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI (2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
crt/legacy/2015/07/31/stlouis_findings_7-31-15.pdf. Some of the findings in that report
relate to state-wide issues inherent in Missouri’s juvenile court structure. See id. at 53.
However, others appear to reflect a need for the same kinds of practice and cultural changes
called for in DOJ’s Ferguson Police Report. See supra note 7.
41. See Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility,
and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68 (1997); see also Emily Buss, The
Missed Opportunity in Gault, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 39, 46 (2003) (referencing Professor Feld’s
continuing call for abolition).
42. See Quinn, supra note 37, 2194–95 (2014) (recounting how various advocates and
academics during the 1990s called for the abolition of juvenile court jurisdiction).
43. See id. at 2194 n.43 (noting how Professor Marty Guggenheim changed course,
initially calling for the end of juvenile courts and then retreated from this position); Martin
Guggenheim, Graham v. Florida and a Juvenile’s Right to Age-Appropriate Sentencing, 47
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 457, 472 (2013) (noting fears of juvenile courts being abolished if
advocates fight too hard for individual rights for youth).
44. Guggenheim, supra note 43, at 473.
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Court was established in 1899, its first presiding judge sent thirtyseven youth to an adult grand jury for presentment. 45 A tiered system
of justice emerged where the most sympathetic youthful offenders
were handled by the juvenile justice system, while those accused of
the most serious crimes might still face adult prison time. 46
Moreover, no uniform rule was established for when a youth or her
actions were so non-childlike that juvenile court was no longer an
option, 47 or how that determination should be made. 48
In 1954, this Janus-faced approach of dealing with kids in court,
as well as the lack of uniformity around denial of juvenile court
jurisdiction, led the New Jersey Supreme Court to lament “there
remain . . . strongly conflicting opinions as to how juveniles should
be dealt with in cases involving homicide and other heinous
misconduct.” 49 A decade later, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Kent v. United States, a case involving a young
person charged with sexual assault. 50 However, the Court was not
squarely presented with the issue of whether it was constitutional to
try youth as adults. Instead, it was asked to review the transfer

45.
46.

Fox, supra note 21, at 1187 n.29.
Richard E. Zimring, The Punitive Necessity of Waiver, in THE CHANGING BORDERS
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 207 (Jeffrey
Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000) (“While juvenile court is the universal rule, every . . .
jurisdiction has provided for exceptions to it.”).
47. Robert O. Dawson, Judicial Waiver in Theory and Practice, in THE CHANGING
BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 45 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2010)
(providing overview of waiver laws across jurisdictions); David Pimentel, The Widening
Maturity Gap: Trying and Punishing Juveniles as Adults in an Era of Extended Adolescence, 64
TEX. TECH L. REV. 71, 86 (2013) (“State systems are all over the map as to which kids get
routed into the adult criminal justice system.”).
48. Today, even the names of the processes differ across jurisdictions. Depending on
where a child lives, she might find herself facing charges in adult court because of processes
referred to as transfer, waiver, certification, statutory exclusion, or direct file procedures. See
Jenny E. Carroll, Rethinking the Constitutional Criminal Procedure of Juvenile Transfer
Hearings: Apprendi, Adult Punishment, and Adult Process, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 175 (2009)
(cataloging the range of terms used to bar a youth from receiving juvenile court treatment; the
terms transfer, waiver, and certification are used interchangeably in this article).
49. State v. Monahan, 104 A.2d 21, 27 (N.J. 1954). The court went on to describe the
wide range of approaches—from courts that believed the more serious the crime, the more
likely the need for the therapeutic intervention of the juvenile justice system, to those that held
even pre-teens should receive the most serious sanctions available under the law for homicides.
50. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 543 (1966).
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procedures provided by the District of Columbia and determine
whether they were constitutionally adequate. 51
In reversing the criminal conviction of the teen in that matter,
the Court noted the significance of a proceeding that could forever
remove a child from the jurisdiction of juvenile court and warned
that such a determination needed to be undertaken with great care. 52
Moreover, due process mandated meaningful assistance of counsel to
defend a child against transfer to adult criminal court. 53
Over the next two decades, numerous challenges were brought
seeking to prohibit youth from being tried as adults—some in cases
where prosecutors had the ability by statute to “direct file” the cases
of youths in adult courts without prior hearing. 54 In these and other
matters defense attorneys sought rulings that gave youth a
constitutional right to, or at least a presumption of, juvenile court
prosecution for alleged wrongdoings. 55 But state and federal courts
presented with these claims denied them. 56 This, in turn, set the
stage for the next wave in the nation’s juvenile justice movement—a

51. Id. at 551–54.
52. Id. at 554 (“We do not consider whether, on the merits, Kent should have been
transferred; but there is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous
consequences without ceremony—without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel,
without a statement of reasons.”).
53. Id. at 554; see also Carroll, supra note 48 (describing Kent’s limited features
and holding).
54. See, e.g., Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 928–29 (Wyo.1984); State v. Bell, 785 P.2d
390 (Utah 1989).
55. See Lynda E. Frost Clausel & Richard J. Bonnie, Juvenile Justice on Appeal, in THE
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL
COURTS 181–206 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000) (describing challenges
across the country during the 1980s and 1990s to statutory exclusion and other juvenile
transfer practices).
56. See e.g., People v. Jiles, 251 N.E.2d 529, 531 (Ill. 1969) (“While there would
probably be almost universal agreement that it is desirable for a State to maintain a juvenile
court . . . we are aware of nothing in the constitution of the United States or of this State that
requires a State to do so.”); State v. Green, 544 P.2d 356, 361 (Kan. 1975) (“[T]he Kansas
Legislature could, in the exercise of its wisdom, withhold the protection of the doctrine of
parens patriae from all juveniles exceeding fifteen years of age.”); State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d
1361, 1363 (Fl. 1980) (finding no inherent or constitutional right to be treated as a juvenile);
see also Woodard v. Wainright, 556 F.2d 781, 785 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[T]reatment as a juvenile
is not an inherent right but one granted by the state legislature, therefore the legislature may
restrict or qualify that right as it sees fit, as long as no arbitrary or discriminatory classification
is involved.”).
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sharp increase in the number of youth prosecuted and sentenced
as adults.
The practice of prosecuting children as miniature adult criminals
became widespread during the 1980s and 90s. 57 Communities and
commentators fed panic around a reported rise in violent juvenile
crimes. Thus a new teen “super-predator” narrative emerged—
primarily targeting youth of color. 58 During the same period a range
of new “tough on crime” laws and practices were used to drastically
increase the number of juveniles tried in criminal courts and
punished with long adult prison terms. 59 Kids regularly received
mandatory terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole during this period, and some were sentenced to execution. 60
At the end of the 1980s the United States Supreme Court took
up two cases that challenged capital punishment for children. In the
first, Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court overturned the death
sentence of fifteen-year-old William Wayne Thompson for his role in
a homicide, holding that it amounted to cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment because it was out of step
with norms of a modern society. 61 The very next year, however, it
denied a similar claim for a two older teens in Stanford v. Kentucky. 62

57. Pimentel, supra note 47, at 86 (“In the 1980s and 1990s, there was an explosion of
legislation across the country that expanded the laws, in almost every state, that allow juveniles
to be tried as adults.”).
58. Perry L. Moriearty & William Carson, Cognitive Warfare and Young Black Males in
America, 15 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 281 (2012); see also Ashley Nellis, The Lives of Juvenile
Lifers: Findings from a National Survey, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 5, 5–6 (2012),
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/jj_The_Lives_of_Juvenile_Lifers.pdf
(unpacking the racially-biased myth of the teen “super-predator” by noting that it arose while
homicide rates for juvenile offenders was actually on the decline).
59. Slobogin, supra note 28, at 104 (2013) (reporting that the number of youth under
eighteen prosecuted as adults rose from approximately 15,000 a year in the 1970s to 250,000
a year by 2007); Quinn, supra note 22, at 11 (“[T]he number of teens in adult correctional
facilities rose from sixteen hundred in 1988, to over nine thousand in 1997.”).
60. Nellis, supra note 58, at 6 (“[T]here was a steep rise in the number of teens who
were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole during the mid-1990s.”); see also, e.g.,
Quinn, supra note 22, at 11–12 (describing how fifteen-year-old William Wayne Thompson
received a death sentence in 1984 for his role in a homicide).
61. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
62. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (Seventeen-year-old Heath Wilkins had
been condemned to die in a Missouri court; Kevin Stanford, the Kentucky litigant, received a
death sentence for a crime committed when sixteen).
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Kids who kill at age sixteen and seventeen, the Court held, could be
sentenced to die consistent with Eighth Amendment principles. 63
C. Legal Limits on Imposing Adult Sentences on Kids
Shortly thereafter, juvenile justice organizations, sentencing
reform groups, social scientists, and even government agencies began
to more vigorously question the wisdom of extreme sentencing
practices and policies for juveniles—a group that came to be more
clearly defined as all youth under the age of eighteen. 64 The work of
these advocates laid the groundwork for a new litigation push that
resulted in a range of restrictions on adult sentences for young
people. 65 Thus the start of this century, like the start of the last, saw a
powerful movement to treat kids differently from adults and protect
them from the harsh, sometimes life-and-death impact of
criminal courts.
In 2005, the United States Supreme Court reconsidered the
question presented by Stanford—that is, whether the Eighth
Amendment precludes imposition of the death sentences for all
juveniles. 66 Determining that standards of human decency had
indeed evolved since 1989, the Court banned executions of all youth
under the age of eighteen. 67 Reaching this conclusion in Roper v.
Simmons, 68 the Court looked not only at legislative enactments and
the direction of change in the law, but at emerging scientific
opinions and international norms relating to adolescence. 69

63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Patricia Allard & Malcolm Young, Prosecuting Juveniles in Adult Court:
Perspectives for Policymakers and Practitioners, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (2002),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/sl_prosecutingjuveniles.pdf (declaring
“imposition of adult punishments, far from deterring crime, actually seems to produce an
increase in criminal activity in comparison to the results obtained for children retained in the
juvenile system”); see also Robert G. Schwartz, Age-Appropriate Charging and Sentencing, 27
CRIM. JUST. 49, 49 (2012) (describing the MacArthur Foundation’s support in the 1990s for
the Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, which produced
numerous studies demonstrating reduced culpability on the part of youth).
65. Nellis, supra note 58, at 6.
66. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
67. Id. at 564–67, 578–79.
68. Id. at 578–79.
69. Id. at 568–78.
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For instance, the Court relied heavily on the work of
developmental psychologists like Jeffrey Arnett 70 and Laurence
Steinberg, 71 as well as interdisciplinary juvenile justice experts like
Elizabeth Scott. 72 Their research supported the Court’s
determination that youth are categorically different from adults in
three key areas—(1) recklessness and risk taking, (2) susceptibility to
peer pressure, and (3) amenability to change given their still
developing characters. Such fundamental differences, the Court held,
made traditional sentencing rationales largely irrelevant to children
under the age of eighteen. 73 It also excluded them from the group of
people who could receive the most extreme sentences under law. 74
Five years later, the Supreme Court applied these factors and
analyses to youth who were sentenced to die behind bars—but who
had not actually killed or intended to kill another person. 75 In
Graham v. Florida the Court again cited emerging understandings of
adolescence, 76 including new medical findings about the still
developing brains of youth. 77 In doing so, it overturned the death-

70. Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior of Adolescents: A Developmental Perspective, 12
DEV. REV. 339 (1992) (documenting the widespread nature of reckless risk taking during
adolescence which diminishes as youth enter adulthood).
71. Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM.
PSYCHOL. 1009 (2003) (psychologist and legal expert call for end of death penalty for youth
given their immaturity and lack of moral development).
72. Id.
73. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70.
74. Id. at 553. The Court further noted the rest of the world had abandoned such
practices as being outdated and barbaric. Id. at 576. Other than Somalia, every country had
outlawed the execution of children under the United Nation’s Convention on the Rights of
the Child. Id. Such international norms also informed the Court’s independent judgment in
determining that evolving standards of decency under the Eighth Amendment precluded death
sentences for all juveniles under the age of eighteen—even for youth who committed
homicidal acts. Id. at 578 (“[W]e acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international
opinion against the juvenile death penalty, resting in large part on the understanding that the
instability and emotional imbalance of young people may often be a factor in the crime.”).
75. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
76. Id. at 68.
77. Id. (relying on opinions of amici, including the American Medical Association,
which noted “parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through late
adolescence”). The Court also relied upon international practices concerning youthful offender
treatment and sentencing, which overwhelmingly outlawed life without parole for children. Id.
at 80 (noting that when applying life without parole sentences to “juveniles who did not
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behind-bars sentence of a seventeen-year-old who had committed an
armed robbery. 78
The Court also held that—other than homicide cases where
specific mens rea was demonstrated—life without parole sentences
for juveniles were cruel, unusual, and constitutionally prohibited. 79
Such absolute terms did not sufficiently allow for the possibility of
rehabilitation in individual cases. 80 And, despite the Court’s long
history of declaring “death is different” for purposes of Eighth
Amendment analysis, it imposed a ban on a category of sentence for
a category of defendants—juveniles—outside of the capital
punishment context for the first time. 81
Thus, Graham may be seen as the start of a unique kind of
constitutional analysis for defendants under the age of eighteen, even
beyond the death penalty context—the evolving standards of youth
doctrine. 82 It created a class of litigants who deserve special attention
in the realm of prosecution practices and policies, but it also
acknowledged that our understanding of youth is transient and everchanging. Indeed, just two years later the Court applied this special
approach to youthful offenders in another non-death penalty case,
Miller v. Alabama, addressing the practice of mandatory juvenile lifewithout-parole prison terms. 83
Here the Court offered new and nuanced reasoning to
substantially amend the proportionality and evolving standards of

commit homicide, the United States adheres to a sentencing practice rejected the
world over”).
78. Id. at 74.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 69 (“It follows that, when compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile
offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability.”).
81. Id. at 61 (applying Roper’s teachings although “here a sentencing practice itself is
in question. This case implicates a particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class of
offenders who have committed a range of crimes”).
82. Quinn, supra note 22 at 12–16 (describing this “particularly noteworthy doctrinal
shift” as reflecting a new wave in our country’s juvenile justice movements). Others have
offered a slightly different take on this development, referring to it as the “children are
different” doctrine. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, “Children are Different”: Constitutional Values
and Justice Policy, 11 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 71, 73 (2013) (“The Court has created a
special status for juveniles through doctrinal moves that had little precedent in its earlier
Eighth Amendment cases.”); Robert Schwartz, supra note 64, at 49 (2012) (referring to the
“tectonic shift” in juvenile justice in light of Roper, Graham, Miller and J.D.B.).
83. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
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decency doctrines as applied to youth—this time for kids who had
killed, but had been mandatorily sentenced to life without parole.84
Uniquely merging the teachings from Roper and Graham with
another line of cases that prohibited death sentences in felony
murder matters without an assessment of culpability, 85 the Court
prohibited automatic imposition of death behind bars penalties
without an individualized sentencing hearing. 86 Again noting
emerging social scientific findings about the developing natures of
juveniles, 87 the Court issued a blanket prohibition against blanket
sentences in juvenile homicide cases that do not take account of the
differences between youth and adults. 88
D. Evolving Standards for Trying and Treating Youth
Presented in this way, Supreme Court jurisprudence relating to
accused youth appears to involve two distinct bodies of law: older
cases that provide procedural rights in juvenile proceedings, and
newer cases that provide substantive sentencing limits in adult court
proceedings. As to the latter, just as occurred in the wake of Kent
and Gault in the 1960s, 89 many commentators have begun to
consider their further implications. 90 For instance, scholars like Cara
Drinan and Marty Guggenheim have projected we will see more
categorical bars on particular kinds of adult sentences for kids—such
as life without parole or mandatory prison terms. 91 At least one state
high court—Iowa’s—has already jettisoned mandatory minimums

84. Id. at 2463–75.
85. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586 (1978).
86. Miller, 567 U.S. at 2460.
87. Id. at 2464 (relying further on Steinberg, Scott, and the American Psychological
Association). For whatever reason, the Court did not discuss international norms in the
Miller decision.
88. Id.at 2460.
89. See Quinn, supra note 37, at 2193 (recounting contemporary reactions to Gault
which saw the decision as part of the due process revolution of the Warren Court).
90. See generally Paul Litton, Symposium: Bombshell or Babystep? The Ramifications of
Miller v. Alabama for Sentencing Law and Juvenile Crime Policy, 78 MO. L. REV. 1003 (2013)
(describing symposium focusing on the legal implications of Miller).
91. See Cara H. Drinan, The Miller Revolution, 101 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming
2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2475126; Guggenheim, supra note 43.
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for youth based upon Miller’s analysis. 92 Some lower courts are
doing the same. 93
Others believe these cases require rethinking juvenile court
practices. For instance, Elizabeth Scott has suggested Roper and its
progeny may shape not only youth sentencing but also juvenile
transfer practices. 94 That is, “given that juveniles are presumptively
less culpable than their adult counterparts, the decision about
whether a particular youth will be tried as an adult should be made
in a way that is compatible with constitutional values.” 95 Scott
believes that only the most serious felony matters should face the
possibility of certification to criminal court and only after an
individualized hearing to determine the appropriateness of such
transfer in that particular case. 96 Thus direct filing of youth under the
age of eighteen into adult courts should be precluded.
This Article argues that we might read the most recent Supreme
Court pronouncements on juvenile sentencing together with older
cases on juvenile court practices to address yet another area ripe for
reform. Beyond portending new approaches for “deep end” juvenile
prosecutions—serious felony cases where adult prison terms are
possible—such an analysis supports reconsideration of minor
municipal court matters that involve young people. This includes
how cases of children are processed in local institutions like the
Ferguson Municipal Court in St. Louis County, Missouri.
II. AMERICAN MUNICIPAL COURT SYSTEMS
Local municipal courts are both ubiquitous and invisible on the
American legal landscape. 97 Almost all community residents at some

92. State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 2014); Grant Rodgers, Iowa Ruling Shifts
from Mandatory Minimums for Juveniles, DES MOINES REG. (July 19, 2014, 12:39 AM CDT),
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2014/07/18/iowa-ruling-shifts-frommandatory-minimums-for-juveniles/12833927/.
93. See, e.g., State v. Smiley, Case No. 1331-CR04069 (Greene Co. Cir. Ct. Mo., Jan.
6, 2015).
94. Scott, supra note 82.
95. Id. at 99.
96. Id. at 99–100.
97. I refer to courts of first resort that enforce local ordinance and code violations as
“municipal courts.” But as will be further explained, such venues have different names in
different places depending on the nature of the local government structure. They may be
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point in their lives are likely to visit these institutions to deal with
traffic infractions or local ordinance violations. 98 Yet they have
received little attention in modern legal scholarship. 99 With the world
watching events unfold in Ferguson, however, many are now
beginning to ask questions about the appropriate role and reach of
local governments—including their courts. 100
Some of these questions were posed in decades past. 101 Indeed,
just as juvenile courts have a somewhat cyclical and contested
history, the same is true for local municipal courts in the United
States. Their story has also vacillated between the thematic poles of
autonomy and dependence. For these institutions, the ongoing
inquiry has been whether local governments should be seen as
independent free agents with broad discretion, or merely state
subdivisions operating under limited license and in need of close
monitoring and supervision. Youth have suffered as a result of the
alternating commitments of juvenile justice policies in the country.
Now, many are currently enduring hardships due to the municipal
government pendulum, which has been permitted to swing too far in
the direction of local autonomy over the state’s interests of
supporting and protecting youth.
known as city courts, traffic courts, police courts, village courts, mayor’s courts, justice of the
peace courts, or by some other designation.
98. Howard I. Kalodner, Note, Metropolitan Courts of First Instance, 70 HARV. L. REV.
320, 320 (1956) (“Criminal courts of first instance constitute the only contact that most
Americans ever have with the judiciary.”); Municipal Courts, CITY OF EL PASO,
https://www.elpasotexas.gov/municipal-courts (last visited 20 Nov. 2015) (“The judges and
staff of El Paso Municipal Court recognize that for most people their impression of the justice
system is derived from their experience in municipal courts.”).
99. Two notable and very thoughtful exceptions to this scholarly silence are Wayne A.
Logan, The Shadow of Criminal Law of Municipal Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1409 (2001)
and David M. Jaros, Preempting the Police, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1149 (2014). As will be further
discussed below, while municipal courts have received little contemporary scholarly attention,
in recent years press accounts and advocacy groups have begun to shed light on their practices.
See William Glaberson, In Tiny Courts of N.Y., Abuses of Law and Power, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept.
25,
2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/25/nyregion/25courts.html?page
wanted=all; Hannah Rappleye & Lisa Riordan Seville, The Town That Turned Poverty into a
Prison Sentence, THE NATION, (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/townturned-poverty-prison-sentence/.
100. See Balko, supra note 8; Aaron Lewis, Don’t Shoot, DATELINE AUSTRALIA-SBS
(Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.sbs.com.au/news/dateline/story/dont-shoot.
101. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Administration of Justice in the Modern City, 26 HARV.
L. REV. 302, 310 (1913); T.E. Lauer, Prolegomenon to Municipal Court Reform in Missouri,
31 MO. L. REV. 69 (1966).
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A. Municipal Justice Generally
Life in colonial America revolved around farm, family, and
church, with parishes or townships growing up around these
institutions. 102 Over time, these units established their own forms of
local government, including informal adjudicative systems to resolve
disputes among neighbors and claims of wrongdoing in the
community. 103 Most localities borrowed from the English Crown’s
historic practice of appointing peace keepers—or justices of the
peace—for this purpose. 104 And even as colonies reformed themselves
as sovereign states, adopted state constitutions, and then ratified the
federal Constitution, many colonial practices continued. 105
For instance, Georgia’s state constitution provided both statelevel superior courts and local-level inferior courts. 106 The latter
included courts presided over by justices of the peace with limited

102. WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN
IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 28
(Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., 1973) (noting colonies encompassed “smaller units,
called counties or districts” and these were further divided into “cities, towns, townships, and
parishes”); see also Mae C. Quinn, From Turkey Trot to Twitter: Policing Puberty, Purity, and
Sex-Positivity, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 51 (2014) (describing the role of church,
family, and the home in early America).
103. See ADAMS, supra note 102, at 4–6 (noting that while early America rejected the
idea of a monarchy, its founders drew from English constitutional teachings); Chester H.
Smith, Note, The Justice of the Peace System in the United States, 15 CAL. L. REV. 118, 118
(1927) (noting that in colonial America, “the problem was to settle disputes among neighbors
and to prevent friction where possible”).
104. MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE
ERA CHICAGO 7–10 (2003); see also History of Justices of the Peace, GOV’T S. AUSTRL. ATT’Y
GEN. DEP’T (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.agd.sa.gov.au/government/about-us/
department/justice-peace-services/history-justices-peace (comparing justices of the peace to
knights appointed by the King of England as peace keepers for unruly areas).
105. EDWARD PEASE ALLINSON & BOIES PENROSE, PHILADELPHIA 1681–1887: A
HISTORY OF MUNICIPAL DEVELOPMENT xiii-xliii (1887), http://www.archive.org/stream/
philadelphia168100alliuoft/philadelphia168100alliuoft_djvu.txt
(describing
shared
governance at the birth of the country, with many seeing the local unit as the dominant
concern); see also Paul Revelson, Nothing But Trouble: The Ohio Legislature’s Failed Attempts
to Abolish Mayor’s Courts, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 223, 224–25 (2010) (explaining Ohio’s
justice of peace courts, which existed through the 1800s, operated in small towns and handled
civil matters for up to seventy dollars in damages, preliminary hearings for felony cases, and
adjudications for minor criminal matters like affrays).
106. Edward C. Brewer, III, The City Court of Atlanta and the 1983 Georgia
Constitution: Is the Judicial Engine Souped Up or Blown Up?, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 941, 946–
47 nn.19 & 21 (1999).
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adjudicative powers who passed judgment in cases “of conscience”
or disputes about small sums of money. 107 New Jersey’s first
Constitution also established justice-of-the-peace courts that allowed
for justices to be chosen through local elections and to preside over
non-jury matters in community-based courts. 108
As the United States grew, however, so did local government.109
Communities became less homogenous both in terms of their
populations and their forms. Emerging industrial cities drew large
and diverse populations at the turn of the last century. 110 Suburbs
also emerged. 111 All of this presented challenges for previously parishbased government thinking and structures.
Some saw growth and modernization as an opportunity for
greater professionalism in local government. 112 Historically, justices
of the peace received jobs as a result of political patronage or by
offering special treatment to influential community members.113
They were paid from fines and fees they were able to collect from
litigants, raising questions about their objectivity. 114 And most were
not lawyers, law-trained, or schooled in legal ethics. 115
107. Id.
108. John Morelli, Rising from the Chaos: A History of the Municipal Courts, 187 N.J.
LAW. 8, 8–9 (1997).
109. Smith, supra note 103, at 118 (“But today with paved roads, automobiles and
instant communication . . . it is safe to say that the conditions which forced the creation and
spread of the justice of the peace system in the United States have long since ceased to exist.”).
110. Roscoe Pound, supra note 101, at 310 (“[O]ur common-law polity postulates an
American farming community of the first half of the nineteenth century; a situation as far apart
as the poles from what our legal system has had to meet in the endeavor to administer justice
to great urban communities at the end of the nineteenth and in the twentieth century.”).
111. Mark B. Feldman & Everett L. Jassy, Note, The Urban County: A Study of New
Approaches to Local Government in Metropolitan Areas, 73 HARV. L. REV. 526, 526 (1960)
(“[A] projection of population outward from the central city into suburban ‘dormitory
communities’ has occurred concurrently with the familiar movement from rural areas into the
central cities.”).
112. See generally Pound, supra note 101 (lauding modernization of courts).
113. Smith, supra note 103, at 121–22 (describing how local politics and influence
impacted the work of justices of the peace).
114. WILLRICH, supra note 104, at 9–10; see also Morelli, supra note 108, at 9
(recounting critiques of justices of the peace in New Jersey, whose “compensation . . .
depended in part on the penalties they assessed against defendants they found guilty of
some offense”).
115. Pound, supra note 101, at 305 (noting that during the 1800s “[a]dministration of
justice by lay judges, by executive officers, and by legislatures was crude, unequal, and often
partisan, if not corrupt”).

1268

QUINN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

1247

4/5/2016 2:13 PM

In Loco Juvenile Justice

Others believed new kinds of local court systems were needed to
deal with specialized issues presented by busy urban areas, shared
spaces, and the “vices” allegedly created by city living. 116 In
particular, Progressive Era social reformers saw local criminal courts
as a means of deploying more nuanced and humane decision-making
to help solve family and community problems. 117 It is perhaps no
surprise, then, that Chicago—home of the first juvenile court in
1899—served as one of the first sites for judicial innovation for adult
defendants during the same era. 118 This included specialized local
dockets intended to address the “social issues” underlying specific
criminal charges, such as family discord and mental illness. 119 Thus, at
about the same time as the launch of the juvenile court movement,
the United States also saw a proliferation of local-level specialized
courts for adults. 120
But while many supported such innovations, some claimed these
experiments in justice created confusion, contributed to duplicative
processes, and fostered disparities in case outcomes. 121 New questions

116. See id. at 311–12 (“Demand for socialization of law, in America, has come almost
wholly if not entirely from the city” in light of needs to address housing congestion, sanitation,
and protection of the vulnerable); see also Percy Stickney Grant, How To Put the People Behind
the Law, N. AM. REV., Nov. 1911, at 699−709 (report outlining the ways in which law and
legal institutions, including the courts, failed to account for turn-of-the-century developments
such as tenement-house living, dangerous factory work, and immigration).
117. See THE COMM. OF FIFTEEN, THE SOCIAL EVIL (Edwin R. A. Seligman ed., 2d ed.
1912) (noting a reform group’s recommendations for improving legal processes relating to
prostitution cases with a view towards curing the “social evil” of sex work and its implications);
Bertha Rembaugh, Problems of the New York Night Court for Women, 2 WOMEN L.J. 45
(1912) (urging new more therapeutic practices in the city’s night court for young women
accused of prostitution).
118. See WILLRICH supra note 104, at 6, 32, 96–127 (cataloging the ways in which
Chicago’s city court system, with its own psychiatric unit, became one of the first in the
country to attempt social engineering through mental health and other intervention
for litigants).
119. See generally id.
120. See, e.g., Women Should Be Judged by Women, 4 WOMEN L.J. 45 (1915) (reporting
on Georgia Bullock’s appointment to serve as the first judge in the Los Angeles Women’s
Court, a special court for women defendants and juvenile cases, and calling for its replication);
See Anna M. Kross & Harold M. Grossman, Magistrates’ Courts of the City of New York:
History and Organization, 7 BROOK. L. REV. 133, 174 (1937) (noting that, in New York City,
“[t]he first specialized court created by resolution was the Manhattan traffic court, on March
2, 1916,” and that many more followed over the next few decades).
121. Brewer, supra note 106, at 956−57 (recounting the fight to impose greater
uniformity upon Atlanta’s city courts during the 1940s); Morelli, supra note 108, at 8 (“By
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also arose about the source and extent of local government
authority—including the power and expertise of local judges to get
involved in complex matters of human behavior without sufficient
support or training. 122 More than this, in some urban areas, close
relationships among local judges, police, and bondsmen resulted in
new system dysfunctions, abuses of discretion, and widespread corruption. 123
Ultimately, from the 1910s through the 1960s, waves of local
court reform took place across the country. 124 Some of these efforts
sought to reduce confusion and increase uniformity, resulting in
early problem-solving courts falling by the wayside. 125 But some

the early 20th century, the New Jersey judicial system was a confusing jumble of courts.”); see
also Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 46
J. AM. JUD. SOC. 55, 62 (1962) (noting the resulting “[m]ultiplicity” of courts is characteristic
of archaic law”).
122. See Kross & Grossman, supra note 120, at 133, 159 (recounting the results of the
Page Commission study of 1910, which sought to bring greater professionalism to New York’s
magistrates’ courts, but noting the return of problems in the 1930s); see also Morris Ploscowe,
The Significance of Recent Investigations for the Criminal Law and Administration of Criminal
Justice, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 823 (1952) (calling for greater oversight of local police
activity to avoid unprofessional behaviors and more even-handed prosecution practices of
crimes, like gambling, overlooked in some districts).
123. See Mae C. Quinn, “Feminizing” Courts: Lay Volunteers and the Integration of
Social Work in Progressive Reform, in FEMINIST LEGAL HISTORY 206, 208−09 (Tracy A.
Thomas & Tracey Jean Boisseau eds., 2011) (describing the work of women lawyers and
others who sought to rid New York’s magistrates’ courts of corrupt bondsmen who took
advantage of poor women defendants in the 1910s); Aaron D. Simowitz, How Criminal Law
Shapes Institutional Structures: A Case Study of American Prostitution, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
417, 434−35 (2013) (recounting how organized crime infiltrated New York City magistrates’
courts in the 1930s, including using designated bondsmen for alleged prostitutes working for
the organization).
124. Robert E. Allard, Court Reorganization Reform–1962, 46 J. AM. JUD. SOC. 110
(1962) (cataloging differences in court reform efforts in seven different states); Alden Ames,
The Origin and Jurisdiction of the Municipal Courts in California, 212 CAL. L. REV. 117,
117−18 (1933) (outlining the goals of California’s 1924 constitutional amendments and the
Municipal Courts Act); Revelson, supra note 105, at 226 (noting that Ohio’s inferior court
system underwent significant changes in 1910 with the “creation and growth of the
municipal court”).
125. Allard, supra note 124, at 110−14 (noting the differing motivations for reform of
courts of first resort, including overlapping jurisdiction and inefficiencies); see generally Mae C.
Quinn, The Modern Problem-Solving Court Movement: Domination of Discourse and Untold
Stories of Criminal Justice Reform, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 57 (2009).
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states also made way for even greater autonomy in local law making,
law enforcement, and prosecution functions. 126
Under new “home rule” provisions, 127 local entities—frequently
referred to as municipalities—could establish themselves by way of
incorporation or charter to run their own law making bodies and
courts. 128 Such localities were given a fair amount of independence—
with the law surrounding limits on their powers being developed as
they were built. 129
Today the model municipal structure contemplates a local
government with authority bounded by state law preemption
principles. 130 Generally, local legislatures can pass local laws relating
only to the health and safety of their communities—such as local
traffic provisions and basic rules of community engagement—that do

126. See, e.g., George C. S. Benson, Joseph D. McGoldrick’s The Law and Practice of
Municipal Home Rule 1916-1930, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (1934) (book review) (“[T]he
power to establish courts is normally a state power, though California and Colorado
constitutions specifically confer the power to create municipal and police courts upon cities.”);
see also Feldman & Jassy, supra note 111 (describing the emergence and challenges of the
“home rule” movement, fostering more formal local entities for purposes of governance
and services).
127. Note, Conflicts Between State Statutes and Municipal Ordinances, 72 HARV. L. REV.
737, 738−39 (1959) (“Typical home-rule [constitutional] amendments provide that any
community of a certain minimum size . . . may adopt a charter for its own government, which
charter shall be submitted for approval to the voters of the community by referendum and
then to the legislature or governor.”).
128. See Ames, supra note 124, at 118 n.15 (“The word ‘municipal’ is most frequently
defined as pertaining to a city or corporation having the right of local self-government.”)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). An examination of all differences
among local political structures—including the distinction between general and special
localities—is beyond the scope of this paper. For more information on these topics, see
generally Number of Municipal Governments & Population Distribution, NAT’L LEAGUE OF
CITIES,
http://www.nlc.org/build-skills-and-networks/resources/cities-101/citystructures/number-of-municipal-governments-and-population-distribution (last visited Sept.
19, 2015).
129. Note, Judicial Inquiry into the Validity of a Municipal Ordinance, 14 YALE L.J.
280, 281 (1905) (“[M]unicipal by-laws and ordinances are subject to investigation in the
courts with a view to determining whether or not there has been an unwarranted interference
with constitutional rights.”); Note, supra note 127, at 739 (“If a municipality acts beyond the
authority granted it by the legislative enabling act or constitutional home-rule provision or
charter adopted thereunder, the action is ultra vires and therefore invalid whether or not it
conflicts with a state statute.”); see also Logan, supra note 99, at 1424 (noting the continuing
contemporary tension between state preemption doctrine and local deference).
130. Jaros, supra note 99, at 1152–53 (“Intrastate preemption occurs when state law
precludes local governments from exercising their authority in a particular field.”).
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not run contrary to state law. 131 Local municipal executives, such as
mayors, approve such laws and local police enforce them within the
confines of geographic municipal boundaries by way of citation or
arrest. 132 Local judges, who are required to comply with state laws
and apply constitutional due process principles, adjudicate alleged
transgressions of local codes within municipal courts. 133
But in many parts of the country, serious questions about the
efficacy, fairness, and integrity of local courts continue to this day. 134
And perhaps no local government and municipal court system has
received more public attention than Ferguson—one of ninety small
independent municipalities in St. Louis County, Missouri.
B. St. Louis County Case Study
Just over one million people live in Missouri’s St. Louis
County. 135 However, as highlighted in recently released advocacy

131. Id. at 1169; see also Note, supra note 127, at 737, 739 (“When a municipality
adopts a home-rule charter, and in some states even before the adoption of such a charter, it
gains the right to enact ordinances governing a wide range of local and municipal affairs.”).
132. See NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, supra note 128, (describing forms of local
governments and municipalities as the predominant general form of local political structure);
see also GA. MUN. ASS’N, HANDBOOK FOR GEORGIA MAYORS AND COUNCILMEMBERS 1, 1−2
(2012),
http://www.gmanet.com/GMASite/media/PDF/
handbook/handbook_complete.pdf.
133. See, e.g., Morelli, supra note 108, at 9 (“The [New Jersey] Legislature abolished
police, magistrate and recorder courts, and in their place authorized the establishment by
ordinance of a municipal court or a joint municipal court with one or more other
municipalities.”); Revelson, supra note 105, at 226 (noting that, in Ohio “[b]y 1951, with the
passage of ‘a uniform law governing the powers and subject matter jurisdiction of municipal
courts,’ nearly all police courts were replaced by municipal courts” but mayor’s courts
remained in some areas).
134. See, e.g., Kristina J. Bohn-Elia, Soundoff, ARIZ. ATTORNEY, May 2005, at 8
(featuring a public defender weighing in on due process and right to counsel deprivations in
Arizona’s municipal courts); Elizabeth A. Campbell & Tanya M. Marcum, Disbursement of
Fines and Costs in Civil Infraction Cases, 80 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 345 (2003) (describing
conflicts of interest and other issues existing in Michigan courts that process low-level civil
infractions); Glaberson, supra note 99 (“[S]erious things happen in these little rooms all over
New York State. People have been sent to jail without a guilty plea or a trial, or tossed from
their homes without a proper proceeding.”).
135. According to 2013 census data estimates, 1,001,444 people live in the County of
St. Louis. See U.S. State and County Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/29/29189.html (last visited Sep. 20, 2015).
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group reports, 136 this population is spread across ninety different
localities of vastly different sizes. 137 Almost all localities are
independently incorporated municipalities that run their own local
governments, including legislative bodies, executive agencies, and
courts. 138 One of these municipalities is the town of Ferguson. 139
Ferguson has a population of about 21,000 people. 140 Two-thirds
of its residents are Black and more than one-third of the children live
below the poverty line. 141 Yet according to one study, last year the
Ferguson Municipal Court handled approximately 12,000 municipal
ordinance violation cases. 142 With a Municipal Code comprised of
hundreds of different provisions, potential charges run the gamut—
everything from littering and loitering to traffic violations. 143
Most cases start by way of citation or arrest. Notably, however,
the Ferguson Police Department is ninety-four percent White while
the community it serves is more than two-thirds Black, creating a
high level of distrust and concern about racial bias. 144 And, in fact,
according to the state’s attorney general statistics, the agency has

136. ArchCity Defenders is a non-profit legal services group that provides free direct
representation in criminal and civil matters, while working to connect clients with housing and
other social services. See ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, MUNICIPAL COURTS WHITE PAPER,
http://www.archcitydefenders.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/ArchCity-DefendersMunicipal-Courts-Whitepaper.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2015). Better Together is a project of
the Missouri Council for a Better Economy, a grassroots, non-profit group interested in
improving the economy and quality of life in the St. Louis area. See About Better Together,
BETTER TOGETHER, http://www.bettertogetherstl.com/about (last visited Sept. 20, 2015).
137. ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, supra note 136, at 4 (“St. Louis County is comprised of
90 municipalities ranging in population from 12 to over 50,000.”); see also Public Safety –
Municipal Courts, BETTER TOGETHER, (Oct. 2014), http://www.bettertogetherstl.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/10/BT-Municipal-Courts-Report-Full-Report1.pdf.
138. BETTER TOGETHER, supra note 137, at 5 (noting that about eighty municipalities
in St. Louis County run their own local court systems).
139. See CITY OF FERGUSON, http://www.fergusoncity.com/ (last visited Sept.
20, 2015).
140. BETTER TOGETHER, supra note 137, at 30.
141. ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, supra note 136, at nn. 67−71 and accompanying text.
142. Id. at 31.
143. FERGUSON, MO. CODE OF ORDINANCES, https://www.municode.com/library/
mo/ferguson/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTIICOOR (last visited Sept. 30, 2015).
144. Rebecca Leber, Ferguson’s Police Force Is 94 Percent White—And That’s Basically
Normal in the U.S., NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/
119070/michael-browns-death-leads-scrutiny-ferguson-white-police.
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long engaged in racially disproportionate vehicle stops
and investigations. 145
Generally, an individual cited for a municipal code violation was
either arrested or instructed to come to court on a future date. 146 If
arrested, a defendant would be held until the court could see her to
consider release or, alternatively, police might inform the accused of
the amount of bail that could be posted to secure release. 147 By way
of example, during recent protests in Ferguson, citizens were
arrested for failing to disperse and forced to post bail in amounts as
high as $1,000 to secure pre-trial release for these civil ordinance
violation matters. 148
Yet during this process of citation or arrest, court appearance,
and possible sentencing, most defendants were not represented. 149
State public defenders do not offer services in these courts. 150 And
localities like Ferguson seldom provide court-appointed counsel for
indigent defendants, claiming in part that municipal matters are
merely low-level civil cases. 151 Many run assembly-line-like court

145. MISSOURI ATTORNEY GENERAL, MISSOURI TRAFFIC STOP REPORTS (2014),
https://www.ago.mo.gov/home/vehicle-stops-report
(reflecting
significant
overrepresentation of black drivers in Ferguson traffic stops for over a decade).
146. Frances Robles, Mistrust Lingers as Ferguson Takes New Tack on Fines, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/us/mistrust-lingers-as-fergusontakes-new-tack-on-fines.html?_r=0.
147. Julia Lurie & Katie Rose Quandt, How Many Ways Can the City of Ferguson Hit
You with Court Fees? We Counted, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 12, 2014, 5:30 AM EDT),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/09/ferguson-might-have-break-its-habithitting-poor-people-big-fines (“Ferguson Municipal Court is only in session three days a
month, so if you can’t meet bail, you might sit in jail for days until the next court session.”).
148. Rebecca Rivas, Lawyers Say High Bonds for Protestors are Unlawful and Unfair, ST.
LOUIS AM. (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.stlamerican.com/news/local_news/article_
bdd62ee0-498c-11e4-8a3d-83313fda3102.html.
149. Balko, supra note 8 (estimating that fewer than twenty-five percent of defendants in
St. Louis County municipal courts are represented by counsel); ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, supra
note 136, at 7 (“[I]n all but a very few, these municipalities fail to provide lawyers for those
who cannot afford counsel.”).
ST.
PUB.
DEF.
(2004),
150. Frequently Asked Questions for Clients, MO.
http://www.publicdefender.mo.gov/clients/FAQ_clients.htm; see also Mo. Rev. Stat. §
600.042.4 (2015) (“[D]efenders shall not be required to provide legal services to persons
charged with violations of county or municipal ordinances, or misdemeanor offenses except as
provided in this section.”).
151. See, e.g., Your Rights In Municipal Court, LEE’S SUMMIT, MISSOURI MUNICIPAL
COURT,
http://cityofls.net/Municipal-Court/Court-process/Your-Rights-in-MunicipalCourt.aspx (last visited Sept. 30, 2015) (informing defendants of their “right to retain an
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dockets, 152 where hundreds of defendants might be summoned to
court on any given night. 153 Generally they were not provided with
meaningful explanations of their options, advice about pleading
guilty, or information about the collateral consequences that may
flow from entering a plea—including the issuance of arrest warrants
or possible loss of driving privileges. 154
In such systems, many municipal court defendants do not fully
appreciate the consequences of failing to contest their charges. In
fact, regardless of their civil designation for purposes of informal
processes and lack of counsel, such matters frequently result in
significant punitive and financial sanctions, including hefty “court
fees” simply for being processed by the courts. 155 And in many St.
Louis municipal courts, pleading guilty has resulted in arrest and jail
time when a defendant is unable to pay fines or complete conditions
of probation, or does not appear for future case docketing. 156
But arrest, bail, and jail for civil violations, particularly when
accompanied by deprivation of the right to counsel and punishment
for poverty, is simply inconsistent with American constitutional
values. 157 The issue has not been squarely addressed by the United
States Supreme Court, 158 but most states agree civil infractions

attorney” and where jail might be imposed “the Court will advise you to seek counsel”—but
no mention of the right to court appointed attorneys).
152. Baldasar v. Ilinois, 446 U.S. 222, 228 n.2 (1980) (Marshall, J. concurring)
(referencing municipal court practices as providing “assembly-line” justice).
153. Balko, supra note 8 (reporting on court being held on a basketball court in
Florissant, Missouri in order to accommodate the volume).
154. Even until recently the Ferguson City Website did not provide meaningful
information about the court’s processes or the rights of persons charged there. In fact, the
city’s court website was buried deep in part of the public safety and Ferguson Police
Department webpages. See City Courts, CITY OF FERGUSON, http://www.fergusoncity.com/
60/The-City-Of-Ferguson-Municipal-Court (last visited Sept. 30, 2015); see also ARCHCITY
DEFENDERS, supra note 136, at 7 (noting that “unrepresented defendants often enter pleas of
guilty without knowing that they have the right to consult with a lawyer . . . [and] without a
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver” of their rights).
155. See Lurie & Quandt, supra note 147.
156. Balko, supra note 8.
157. Rivas, supra note 148 (quoting this author as questioning the legality of arrests and
bail conditions for civil violations and without provision of counsel).
158. It also appears that the Missouri Supreme Court has yet to squarely address this
issue in this context. Cf. Strode v. Director of Revenue, 724 S.W.2d 245 (Mo. 1987) (en banc)
(challenging arrest unsuccessfully under a municipal ordinance based on conflicting state and
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should not serve as grounds for arrest. 159 In fact, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals recently reinstated a false arrest claim based on a
San Francisco police officer’s action in taking an individual into
custody for an alleged civil violation. 160 And while the United States
Supreme Court has upheld the ability to arrest for low-level, fineonly traffic matters under the Fourth Amendment—that case,
Atwater v. Lago Vista, involved alleged violations that were criminal
in nature. 161
In fact, Missouri’s Criminal Code provides that state-level civil
infractions are legally different from criminal charges. 162 Missouri
courts have repeatedly reiterated the same. 163 To the extent the
various Missouri statutes, rules, and local municipal codes conflict on
the issue of whether arrest and jail may follow from a local civil

local driving under the influence provisions; claim did not directly challenge law enforcement’s
ability to arrest for civil municipal code violation in the first instance).
159. See, e.g., Civil Motor Vehicle Infractions FAQ, MASS. COURT SYS. (2015),
http://www.mass.gov/courts/selfhelp/tickets/cmvi-faq.html (explaining that mere civil
traffic violations, if ignored, result in civil penalties like suspension of driving privileges and
that criminal traffic violations can result in the criminal sanction of arrest); Traffic and
Nontraffic Civil Infraction Matters, MICH. COURTS., http://courts.mi.gov/selfhelp/center/casetype/pages/infraction.aspx (last visited Sept. 30, 2015) (“A person cannot
be sent to jail for a civil infraction unless they are found to be in civil contempt.”); Types of
Traffic Offenses, HAW. STATE JUDICIARY, (2008), http://www.courts.state.hi.us/selfhelp/traffic/types_of_violations.html (describing the difference between criminal traffic
infractions, which allow for arrest and incarceration, and civil traffic infractions which do not).
160. Edgerly v. San Francisco, 713 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that arrest for
California civil infraction could provide grounds for false arrest claim); cf. Virginia v. Moore,
553 U.S. 164 (2008) (upholding mistaken arrest for citation-only misdemeanor crime). Note
further that in Moore the Court upheld an officer’s search incident to arrest following a citeonly traffic offense. But the case presented the issue of a single officer, in a single case, making
a single error—not a standing practice of arrest for civil law violations.
161. 532 U.S. 218 (2001) (noting the charges were brought under a state statute that
classified the actions as misdemeanors); see also Moore, 553 U.S. 164; Charlie Gerstein & JJ
Prescott, Process Costs and Police Discretion, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 268, 284 (2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2543945 (calling for a move towards civil enforcement of low-level,
quality of life offenses, which the authors argue could involve “only very brief detentions” of
no more than twenty-four hours).
162. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 556.021.1 (2014) (“An infraction does not constitute a
criminal offense and conviction of an infraction shall not give rise to any disability or legal
disadvantage based on conviction of a criminal offense.”).
163. See, e.g., City of Cameron v. Stinson, 633 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)
(“[P]rosecutions for the violation of a municipal ordinance are civil and not criminal
proceedings in the constitutional sense” but “have certain quasi-criminal aspects.”); see also
State ex rel. Estill v. Iannone, 687 S.W.2d 172 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
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charge, 164 they should be found either to be unconstitutionally
vague 165 or read in favor of the accused. 166 The St. Louis county
municipal practice of taking people into custody—and in some
instances denying bail—for alleged civil municipal violations, stands
in stark contrast to long understood United States legal norms.
Second, as the United States Supreme Court decided more than
ten years ago in Alabama v. Shelton, 167 defendants facing suspended
jail time are entitled to appointment of counsel. The provision of
counsel is clearly compelled in probation cases, where jail may result
for failure to successfully complete conditions. 168 But municipal court
proceedings, where defendants face arrest or jail for failing to satisfy
fees and fines, should similarly trigger Shelton right to counsel
rules. 169 No matter how these practices might be framed locally, they
are tantamount to the suspended jail time contemplated by Shelton.
Here, too, St. Louis County municipal court practices largely
disregard constitutional representation principles.
Third, incarceration based on indigence is akin to debtors’ prison
practices abandoned long ago. In a series of cases decided in the
1970s and 1980s, the United States Supreme Court held that courts
may not imprison defendants for failing to satisfy financial sanctions
without first determining whether the failure was willful. 170 Such

164. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 544.216 (2014) (stating Missouri law enforcement
officers may effectuate an arrest based on violations of state criminal laws, state law infractions,
or municipal ordinance violations).
165. See, e.g., Christina D. Lockwood, Defining Indefiniteness: Suggested Revisions to the
Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 8 CARDOZO PUB. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 255, 257–58 (2010)
(noting vagueness doctrine is traditionally triggered when laws are “standardless” or allow for
“seriously discriminatory enforcement” but calling for even broader allowance of the
doctrine’s application).
166. See Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV.
885, 889 (2004) (calling the rule of lenity a “meta” rule); see also Damon v. City of Kansas
City, 419 S.W.3d 162, 168 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (stating in Kansas City municipal summons
documents that defendant was required to plead “guilty” or “not guilty” and further including
a threat of warrant and arrest are inconsistent with civil violation practices).
167. 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
168. Id.
169. Id.; see also Erica Hashimoto, Abandoning Misdemeanor Defendants, 25 FED.
SENT’G REP. 103, 103 (2012) (reporting that while the “suspended sentence” standard should
have vastly increased the number of cases in which attorneys are provided, in fact the number
has decreased post-Shelton).
170. See generally Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983) (explaining that probation
may not be revoked based on failure to pay a fine and restitution absent a determination that
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willfulness cannot be found where an individual is simply too poor to
pay the amount ordered. 171 Codified state law in Missouri recognizes
the same. 172 In fact, Missouri law suggests that civil default judgment
is the appropriate remedy when a defendant fails to pay fines, fees, or
costs in conjunction with a state-level civil infraction. 173
Yet practices of civil arrest, pro se defense, and jail punishments
for poverty have persisted for years in Ferguson and other St. Louis
County local courts. 174 In one recent year, Ferguson alone issued
over 20,000 arrest warrants 175 Most warrants stemmed from cases
where there was no lawyer, no meaningful legal advice provided
before plea, and no assessment of the individual’s ability to pay
imposed fines and fees. 176
Much of this has been driven by a desire to collect as much
money as possible for local coffers. In fact, St. Louis municipalities
ambitiously forecast future prosecution revenues each year. 177 And as
property values in poorer areas like Ferguson have fallen, reliance on
court-generated income has increased. 178 While it cost only $313,192
to operate the Ferguson municipal court system last year, it pulled in
more than $1.8 million through financial sanctions and sentences. 179
Commentators have noted that municipal court fines, fees, and costs
serve as a “hidden tax” that disproportionately impacts communities
the non-payment was willful and not based on indigence); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971)
(prohibiting jail of a poor defendant for failure to pay a fine); Williams v. Illinois, 400 U.S. 235
(1970) (finding that punishment based on indigence improper).
171. See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668.
172. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 560.026 (2014) (Imposition of Fines), 560.031 (Response
to Non-Payment); see also id. at § 479.260 (“[T]he judge may assess costs against the
defendant except in those cases where the defendant is found by the judge to be indigent and
unable to pay the costs.”).
173. Id. at § 556.021.1(3).
174. Jeremy Kohler et al., Municipal Courts Are Well-Oiled Money Machine, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 15, 2015, http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/
municipal-courts-are-well-oiled-money-machine/article_2f45bafb-6e0d-5e9e-8fe10ab9a794fcdc.html (“People who can’t afford lawyers are stuck with answering to the original
charge, and sometimes end up in jail if they miss court appearances because they cannot pay.”).
175. ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, supra note 136, at 34, nn.73–74 and accompanying text.
176. See id.
177. BETTER TOGETHER, supra note 136, at 2 (describing how some municipalities
“actually budget for increases in fines and fees”).
178. Id. (“[R]esearch revealed that fines-and-fees revenue increased at a time when
property-tax revenue declined.”).
179. Id. at 27, tbl.6.
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of color and the most economically challenged individuals in the St.
Louis region. 180
After decades of such problems, 181 government and community
advocates are finally beginning to take action and call for reform of
these practices. For instance, in November 2014, Missouri’s
Governor appointed a sixteen-member commission to conduct “a
thorough, wide-ranging and unflinching study of the social and
economic conditions that impede progress, equality and safety in the
St. Louis region.” 182 In December 2014, Missouri’s attorney general
filed suit against several municipalities who appeared to be collecting
more fines and fees than permitted by state law. 183
In 2015, several local advocacy groups filed their own legal
actions, successfully challenging and changing various municipal
court debtors’ prison practices in Ferguson and neighboring
towns. 184 And the Missouri Legislature passed Senate Bill 5, a multifaceted and much celebrated piece of legislation, which seeks to

180. Id. at 2 (“The practice of using fines and fees to impose ‘hidden taxes’ on the
poorest populations is evident.”).
181. Indeed, many of these issues were addressed in a law review article published in the
1960s, and local attorneys have been operating in these courts for decades. See Lauer, supra
note 101.
182. Jay Nixon, Executive Order 14-15, OFF. MO. GOVERNOR (Nov. 18, 2014),
https://governor.mo.gov/news/executive-orders/executive-order-14-15. As this article goes
to press, it remains to be seen what will become of the Commission’s various advisory findings.
For more about Governor Jay Nixon’s “Ferguson Commission,” see The Process So Far, STL
POSITIVE CHANGE, http://stlpositivechange.org/commission-work (last visited Sept.
30, 2015).
183. See Mariah Stewart, Missouri Attorney General Sues Municipalities Over “Predatory”
Traffic Fines, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/
12/18/missouri-traffic-fines-lawsuit_n_6350634.html. These suits were ultimately dismissed,
in part because of legislative reforms adopted in Senate Bill 5. See infra note 187.
184. See, e.g., Monica Davey, Ferguson One of 2 Suburbs Sued over Gauntlet of Traffic
Fines and Jail, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/09/us/
ferguson-one-of-2-missouri-suburbs-sued-over-gantlet-of-traffic-fines-and-jail.html.
These
successful lawsuits and related settlements have focused on jail conditions, money bail issues,
and incarceration based on poverty. See, e.g., Jeremy Kohler, Municipal Courts Make Major
Changes before New Law Takes Effect, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 28, 2015),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/municipal-courts-make-majorchanges-before-new-law-takes-effect/article_480a7d9d-6006-5efc-8521-02ec0d0d3743.html.
Interestingly, to date no suit has squarely challenged the constitutionality of: (1) arrest or
detention practices relating to mere civil violations; or (2) disregard for Shelton when jail
follows conditional discharge violations.
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III. MINORS IN MUNICIPAL COURTS—FORGOTTEN IN FERGUSON
AND BEYOND
These emerging critiques and challenges to local policing and
prosecution practices in St. Louis County are historic and
important. 186 And many important changes appear to be underway.
Remarkably, however, most of these efforts, accounts, and reforms
have largely overlooked one especially vulnerable group harmed by
municipal court practices—children. 187
Fortunately, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) in
its investigation of Ferguson shed further light on this issue. 188 The
DOJ’s well-publicized March 2015 report recounted numerous
instances of local children enduring the same racially biased,
inhumane, and abusive municipal policing practices that were visited
on adults. 189 And after hearing testimony from this author, impacted
185. Robert Patrick & Stephen Deere, “Sweeping” Court Reform Comes as Nixon Signs
Bill to Cap Cities’ Revenue, End Predatory Habits, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (July 10, 2015),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/sweeping-court-reform-comes-asnixon-signs-bill-to-cap/article_cafffb7e-b24d-5292-b7bb-84ef81c6e81d.html.
186. William H. Freivogel, Missouri Supreme Court Eases Penalty for Not Paying Court
Fines, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Jan. 6, 2015), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/missourisupreme-court-eases-penalty-not-paying-court-fines (reporting a change in a municipal court
rule which will require courts to consider indigence in conjunction with fines, which is only
partially response to complaints and will not take effect until summer); see also Editorial Board,
Editorial, Reforms Follow Protests in Ferguson, N.Y TIMES, Sept. 7, 2015, at A16 (“It is no
small achievement that Missouri began enforcing a series of tough new court reforms last
month aimed at ending one particularly flagrant abuse: the systematic fleecing of accused
traffic offenders in a revenue scheme to bolster the budgets of local governments.”).
187. See, e.g., William Freivogel, Two Visions of Municipal Court Reform, ST. LOUIS PUB.
RADIO (Nov. 12, 2014), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/two-visions-municipal-courtreform (reflecting that no groups calling for municipal court reforms have mentioned the
impact of court practices on kids as litigants, or the possibility of redirecting youth from the
reach of such courts); see also Mike Lear, Washington University Professor Wants Missouri
Juvenile Court Reforms, MISSOURINET (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.missourinet.com/
2015/08/17/washington-university-professor-wants-missouri-juvenile-court-reforms/
(recounting this author’s critiques of Senate Bill 5, including its failure to specifically account
for kids in municipal courts).
188. INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 7.
189. Id.; see also Mae C. Quinn, Robbed of Childhood and Chances—Ferguson and
Beyond, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.stltoday.com/news/
opinion/robbed-of-childhood-and-chances-ferguson-and-beyond/article_7d5cdd2f-1e3b-
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youth, and other community members, 190 the Governor’s Ferguson
Commission has turned its attention to the issue of minors in
municipal courts. 191
Indeed, each year in St. Louis—and across the country—
countless young people are forced to contend with the myriad
municipal court problems outlined above. As described throughout
the next section, these issues take on heightened legal and
constitutional significance when visited on juveniles. 192
A. Missouri’s “Shadow” Juvenile Justice System193
In Missouri, juvenile courts were created at the turn of the last
century to provide intervention and assistance for youth in conflict
with the law. 194 Joining the Progressive Era’s movement, Missouri
lawmakers saw value in removing children from the harsh setting and
consequences of criminal courts. 195 The 1905 Juvenile Courts Act
clearly embraced protective in loco parentis thinking, specifically
providing that “care, custody and discipline of the child” in Juvenile

5e40-b95a-68fcf6bba77f.html (describing in part how DOJ’s Ferguson Report should be read
as surfacing the region’s “shadow” juvenile justice systems operating in the shadows of
constitutional and state law).
190. See, e.g., Jason Rosenbaum, Ferguson Commission Eyes Overhaul of Region’s
Municipal Courts, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Dec. 16, 2014), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/
post/ferguson-commission-eyes-overhaul-regions-municipal-courts.
191. See, e.g., Jennifer Mann, Ferguson Commission Seeks Complete Overhaul, Shrinking of
Municipal Courts, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June 23, 2015), http://www.stltoday.com/
news/local/crime-and-courts/ferguson-commission-seeks-complete-overhaul-shrinking-ofmunicipal-courts/article_14b97058-ac3f-537d-9616-1378ed0e0cae.html
(referencing
proposal of limited right to counsel for juveniles in municipal courts). Again, as this article
goes to press, this group’s efforts are still very much in progress and advisory in nature. See
supra note 136.
192. Again, throughout this Article I generally use the terms “minor” and “juvenile”
interchangeably to refer to youth under the age of eighteen.
193. See Elizabeth A. Angelone, Comment, The Texas Two-Step: The Criminalization of
Truancy Under the Texas “Failure to Attend” Statute, 13 SCHOLAR 433, 452 (2010) (referring
to Texas’s “shadow juvenile justice system” in local municipal courts).
194. MO. JUV. JUST. ASS’N, CELEBRATING 100 YEARS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN
MISSOURI: 1903-2003 1 (2003), http://www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/100years.pdf
(describing enabling legislation for Missouri’s first juvenile courts—established in 1903 in St.
Louis and Jackson County).
195. See generally Noah Weinstein, The Juvenile Court Concept in Missouri: Its Historical
Development—The Need for New Legislation, 1957 WASH. U. L. Q. 17, 31 (1957) [hereinafter
Weinstein, Historical Development].
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Court “shall approximate as nearly as may be that which should be
given by its parents . . . .” 196 The Act went on to explain: “[A]s far as
practicable any delinquent child shall be treated, not as a criminal,
but as misdirected and misguided, and needing aid, encouragement,
help and assistance.” 197
Since 1905, the term “child” has been defined, for juvenile
delinquency purposes as someone under the age of seventeen. 198
Missouri was and is an outlier. In 1959 when the possibility of
raising the age of juvenile court jurisdiction was considered as part of
the current “modern” Juvenile Code, Missouri declined to embrace
the change. 199
At that time, thirty-one other states had already raised the age to
eighteen. 200 Today, forty states provide that for purposes of
prosecution, juvenile court jurisdiction extends until a young person
turns eighteen. 201 And, as already discussed, eighteen is the
constitutional cut-off for purposes of juvenile status. 202 Nevertheless,
seventeen-year-olds in Missouri continue to have their municipal
ordinance cases “direct filed” into municipal courts for processing
and prosecution. 203
More than this, children as young as fifteen are now charged in
Missouri’s municipal courts for some local offenses. 204 However,
196. Id. at 31.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 22. The 1903 Juvenile Courts Act provided for original jurisdiction for all
accused youth under the age of sixteen. Id. at 26. Two years later the Act was amended to
extend juvenile court prosecution to sixteen-year-old youth—but not seventeen-year-olds. Id.
at 30.
199. Noah Weinstein & Lee N. Robins, The Juvenile Court in Missouri: 1957-59—A
Survey of Current Developments and Future Requirements, 1959 WASH. U. L. Q. 373,
374 (1959).
200. In 1959, Missouri’s “modern” Juvenile Court’s Act was passed, rejecting a proposal
to raise the age of jurisdiction to eighteen and instead retaining seventeen as the cut-off. Id.
201. JEFFREY A. BUTTS & JOHN K. ROMAN, LINE DRAWING: RAISING THE MINIMUM
AGE OF CRIMINAL COURT JURISDICTION IN NEW YORK 5 (2014); see also Weinstein &
Robins, supra note 199, at 374. Last year the Missouri Legislature finally reconsidered this
dated position. Senator Wayne Wallingford, a Republican, has introduced Senate Bill 213,
seeking to raise the age of juvenile court jurisdiction to eighteen. S. Bill 213, 98th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015), https://legiscan.com/MO/text/SB213/2015.
202. See supra Section I.C.
203. And, of course, they are also “direct filed” into our adult criminal court system for
alleged violations of state criminal laws.
204. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.031.1(3) (2014).
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allowing fifteen and sixteen year olds to be prosecuted in municipal
courts is out of step with historical practices in Missouri. For
instance, at the turn of the last century, even minor local infractions
were directed to specialized juvenile courts for evaluation. 205 And, at
least up through the mid-1960s, most alleged child traffic matters
were directed away from local municipal courts and into specialized
juvenile courts for review. 206 Juvenile court staff handled such issues
as age-appropriate indiscretions on the part of children. 207 For
instance, in 1965, St. Louis County’s Juvenile Court dismissed the
vast majority of such cases—nearly 1000 in all—after providing a
warning or some low-level informal intervention intended to educate
and redirect the child from future violations. 208
Yet Missouri’s current Juvenile Code now precludes juvenile
court treatment for anyone fifteen years of age or older “who is
alleged to have violated a state or municipal traffic ordinance.” 209 All
such matters are handled exclusively by municipal court judges. 210
Other local matters, including curfew prosecutions, also may be filed
directly in municipal courts. 211

205. Weinstein, supra note 195, at 23–30; see also Kalodner, supra note 98, at 340
(stating how in 1956, one commentator noted that the “[p]roblems of juvenile delinquency in
cases of defendants under the age of sixteen almost never fall within the jurisdiction of criminal
courts of first instance”).
206. Weinstein, supra note 195, at 22.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 37.
209. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.031.1 (2)(3). This reflects a change from just a few years
ago, where the cut-off for municipal prosecution of children was fifteen and one-half years old.
See H.B.1171, 145th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012) (reducing municipal court
jurisdiction from age fifteen and one-half to fifteen beginning in 2013 for traffic cases).
Interestingly, the bill was sent to committee with a note suggesting that without such change,
minor traffic offenders were not otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of courts. See COMM. ON
JUDICIARY, H.B. 1171 COMMITTEE BILL SUMMARY, 145th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo.
2012), http://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills121/sumpdf/HB1171C.pdf. In fact,
such cases could have simply remained under state juvenile court jurisdiction. Other legislative
materials erroneously suggested that the law actually expanded juvenile court jurisdiction over
such matters—rather than restricting it. See, e.g., SENATE STAFF, CURRENT BILL SUMMARY
H.B. 1171, 145th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012), http://www.senate.mo.gov/
12info/BTS_Web/Bill.aspx?SessionType=R&BillID=107149; see also COMM. ON JUDICIARY,
H.B. 1171 PERFECTED BILL SUMMARY, 145th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012),
http://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills121/sumpdf/HB1171P.pdf.
210. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.031.1(2)–(3) (2014).
211. Id. (describing Missouri’s concurrent jurisdiction arrangement for curfew cases).
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It is clear that seventeen-year-old children in Missouri have been
arrested, asked to post bail, faced accusation in public court settings,
and received sanctions and punishment, all without any specialized
legal treatment or required appearance of a supportive adult. In
some instances, parents have been turned away at the courthouse
doors and told they are not allowed to accompany their seventeenyear-old children to see the judge. 212 Despite the United States
Supreme Court’s repeated pronouncements that youth are part of a
special category for prosecution purposes up until age eighteen,
Missouri has ignored this constitutional cut-off.
As for fifteen- and sixteen-year-olds, it is not entirely clear how
they are being handled in Missouri municipal courts. As noted
above, municipal courts see themselves as having concurrent
jurisdiction with juvenile courts in some of these child defendant
matters—and exclusive jurisdiction in others. But Missouri’s
Municipal Code does not require special court treatment for these
children—such as confidentiality, appointment of counsel, or waiver
of fines or costs based on minority. Nor does Missouri law expressly
preclude the issuance of bench warrants for fifteen- and sixteen-yearold children for failure to make timely payments of fines and fees. 213
Similarly, while the Missouri Juvenile Code states that youth
under the age of seventeen should not be held in local jails, 214 it does
not expressly prohibit public arrest, transport in handcuffs, or
extended stays in juvenile detention centers for purposes of return on
municipal court bench warrants in traffic or other civil matters.
Yet these cases often stem from nothing more than normal
youthful indiscretions. Parents may be uninformed about the
prosecutions. 215 And, as recently reported by national media, many

212. This author has witnessed this phenomenon—where parents have been told they
are not permitted to join their teenage children in the courtroom, but must instead wait
outside for the child to exit. This author has heard from other advocates about court staff
precluding parents of even young teens from entering the courtroom. Conversation with St.
Louis clinic colleagues, July 2015.
213. See generally e.g., MO. SUP. CT. R. 37.47. (2004).
214. See MO. REV. STAT. § 211.033(1) (2014) (“No person under the age of seventeen
years, except those transferred to the court of general jurisdiction under the provisions of
section 211.071 shall be detained in a jail or other adult detention facility as that term is
defined in section 211.151.”).
215. In fact, during a recent Ferguson City Council Meeting one parent testified that
she did not even know about the traffic tickets, fines, and fees that had been imposed on her
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at-risk teens may be negotiating these punitive processes entirely on
their own. 216 But Missouri is not alone in its ongoing arrangement of
running municipal courts without specialized protections or
concerns for youthful litigants. Several other states have their own
shadow juvenile justice systems that present similarly problematic
pictures of local courts failing to account for youthful vulnerabilities.
B. Invisible Juvenile Justice Systems in Other States
1. Wyoming
Wyoming has created a juvenile justice system rife with
“loopholes” that allow child defendants to face charges in municipal
courts without any prior certification hearing. 217 This is because for
nearly every alleged law violation—whether it is a state crime or a
municipal ordinance violation—the prosecution has the power to
elect to charge the child outside of the juvenile court setting.218
Thus, youth may have their cases directly filed into juvenile, circuit,
or local municipal courts without any concern for their status
as minors. 219
According to critics, historically these decisions have been driven
by the leanings of local police and prosecutors. 220 They have also
resulted in fewer than twenty percent of accused children being

teen sons until well after the fact. See Mae C. Quinn, Open Letter to Mayor of Ferguson:
LOUIS
A M.
(Sept.
24,
2014),
Amnesty
Would
Make
Amends,
ST.
http://www.stlamerican.com/news/columnists/guest_columnists/article_8b705cd2-441411e4-b812-5fdfef440f5c.html.
216. See Seth Freed Wessler & Lisa Riordan Seville, Kids in Court: Is it Time to Raise the
Age for Criminal Responsibility?, NBC NEWS (Jan. 20, 2015, 11:40 AM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/in-plain-sight/kids-court-it-time-raise-age-criminalresponsibility-n289566; see also Quinn, supra note 215.
217. Donna Sheen, Professional Responsibilities Toward Children in Trouble with the Law,
5 WYO. L. REV. 483, 513–15 (2005).
218. John M. Burman, Juvenile Injustice in Wyoming, 4 WYO. L. REV. 669, 677 (2004);
see also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-237 (2014).
219. Burman, supra note 218, at 689 (“[A] juvenile is potentially subject to the
jurisdiction of three different courts: the juvenile court[,] . . . circuit court, . . . or
municipal court.”).
220. See id.
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processed in juvenile courts. 221 Rather, kids of all ages have found
themselves tangled up with Wyoming’s adult courts, resulting in
stories like this one offered by a local attorney: “I’ve seen an eightyear-old in municipal court counting out quarters from her change
purse to pay a fine imposed on her for using chalk on the outside of
a barn.” 222
Like municipal court judges in Missouri, those in Wyoming are
tasked with assessing fines for the benefit of the locality, which are
then deposited with the town’s treasurer. 223 The salary of local judges
is also set by local officials. 224 As in the days of common law justices
of the peace, the bench has incentive to collect as many fines and
court costs as possible. Unlike Missouri, Wyoming municipal court
judges have special statutory powers to allow youth to complete
community service through youth-focused programs. 225 But most
communities do not fund such projects. 226 Wyoming’s shadow
juvenile justice system, unlike Missouri’s system, has previously been
the subject of scrutiny and criticism, as well as attempted reform.227
Yet, reports of direct prosecution of kids in municipal courts without
any specialized protections continue. 228

221.

ACLU, INEQUALITY IN THE EQUALITY STATE: THE DAMAGED JUVENILE JUSTICE
v (2010) (finding youth are subject to “vastly different
treatment based on where they live”).
222. Star Tribune Editorial Bd., Editorial, Wyo Legislators Can Learn from Juvenile
Justice Study, CASPER STAR TRIB., July 18, 2010, http://trib.com/news/opinion/editorial/
wyo-legislators-can-learn-from-juvenile-justice-study/article_72b028ea-70df-5913-acd4e2f3d48cc8ec.html.
223. Burman, supra note 218, at 691–92.
224. Id. at 691.
225. Id. at 692.
226. Id.
227. See, e.g., Burman, supra note 21818; see also Maggie Lee, Wyoming Inches Towards
Reform, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE (Oct. 31, 2012), http://jjie.org/wyoming-inchestoward-reform/.
228. Kelsey Bray, Wyoming’s Juvenile Justice System Sees Progress, WYO. TRIB. EAGLE
(Dec. 23, 2013), http://www.wyomingnews.com/articles/2013/12/23/news/20local_1223-13.txt#.VgV7kMtViko (reporting minor offenses—like youthful alcohol consumption—are
still being directly prosecuted in adult courts); see also Brice Hamack, Go Directly to Jail, Do
Not Pass Juvenile Court, Do Not Collect Due Process: Why Waiving Juveniles into Adult Court
Without a Fitness Hearing is a Denial of their Basic Due Process Rights, 14 WYO. L. REV.
775 (2014).
AND DETENTION SYSTEM IN WYOMING
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2. Texas
Texas also runs a secondary juvenile justice system. Like minors
in Missouri, minors in Texas are excluded from juvenile courts once
they turn seventeen, and are directly prosecuted in municipal courts
for any local ordinance violations. 229 But youth under seventeen years
of age have also faced municipal court prosecution for various Class
C misdemeanors, including truancy, which carry a fine of up to $500
and a possible jail sentence. 230 The problem of aggressive truancy and
school-based prosecutions in Texas has received attention over the
last few years. 231 One municipal court judge in particular became
well-known for imposing criminal convictions on children under
seventeen, fining them $500, suspending their driving privileges, and
imposing community service—all just for missing school. 232 Beyond
publically shaming them in the courtroom, the judges might hold
students who continue to skip class in contempt as well as impose
jail time. 233
In 2013, three advocacy groups filed a complaint with the
United States Department of Justice about such practices. 234 The
Justice Department subsequently opened an investigation in March

229. Angelone, supra note 193, at 458; see also Michele Deitch et al., Seventeen, Going
on Eighteen: An Operational and Fiscal Analysis of a Proposal to Raise the Age of Juvenile
Jurisdiction in Texas, 40 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (2012).
230. Angelone, supra note 193, at 452; see also, e.g., Court Procedures, CITY OF SAN
MARCOS TEX. (2015), http://www.ci.san-marcos.tx.us/index.aspx?page=80 (“The municipal
court has jurisdiction over juveniles (under age 17) charged with most Class C
misdemeanor offenses.”).
231. See, e.g., Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, For More Teens, Arrests by Police Replace
School Discipline, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2014, 10:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/formore-teens-arrests-by-police-replace-school-discipline-1413858602 (describing misdemeanor
“tickets” given in Texas schools that send kids to local adult courts); Michael Mulvey, Dallas
School District Parents with Truant Kids Taught a Lesson, ABC-DALL. (Oct. 16, 2009, 9:50
AM), http://www.wfaa.com/story/news/local/2014/08/06/13424782/.
232. Mulvey, supra note 231.
233. Id.; see also Christina Sterbenz, Texas is Treating Kids Who Skip Class Like GrownUp Criminals, BUS. INSIDER (June 18, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/complaintfiled-over-texas-truancy-court-2013-6.
234. See Letter from Civil Rights Groups to Civil Rights Division accusing Dallas
Schools and Truancy Courts of Civil Rights Violations, TEX. APPLESEED (July 1, 2013),
https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/148-STPP-DOJletterAdding3
Complainants.pdf.
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2015. 235 Since that time, Texas Governor Greg Abbott signed into
law a provision that decriminalizes child truancy. 236 But the law
apparently does not impact the government’s ability to directly
charge children under age seventeen with other Class C
misdemeanors in adult courts. 237
3. Colorado
Colorado prosecutes children in local municipal courts rather
than juvenile courts for matters where jail sentences of less than ten
days may be imposed. 238 Such charges might include anything from
littering 239 to shoplifting. 240 The penalties provided under some local
codes make clear that one set of non-financial penalties is available
for defendants over eighteen years of age, while a different set applies
to defendants under eighteen. For instance, in the municipality of
Grand Junction, adults face up to one year of incarceration for
convictions241 while youth receive community service sentences.242
But both adults and children are subject to fines of up to $1000. 243

235. Press Release, U. S. Dep’t of Just., Department of Justice Announces Investigation
of the Dallas County Truancy Court and Juvenile District Courts (Mar. 31, 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announces-investigation-dallas-countytruancy-court-and-juvenile-district.
236. Texas Turns Away from Criminal Truancy Courts for Students, AL-JAZEERA AM.
(June 20, 2015, 4:00 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/6/20/texas-turnsaway-from-criminal-truancy-courts-for-students.html.
237. Id.
238. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-104(1)(a)(II) (2014).
239. See, e.g., GRAND JUNCTION, COLO. MUN. CODE, ch. 8.12 (2015).
240. For an example of a shoplifting case, see R.E.N. v. City of Colorado Springs, 823
P.2d 1359 (Colo. 1992).
241. THE CHARTER OF THE CITY OF GRAND JUNCTION COLORADO, art. XVII, § 148,
http://www.codepublishing.com/co/grandjunction/html/GrandJunctionCH.html#17.148
(“Any person 18 years of age or older who shall violate any of the provisions of this Charter for
the violation of which no punishment has been provided herein, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one
thousand ($1,000.00) dollars, or by imprisonment in jail not exceeding one year, or by both
such fine and imprisonment.”).
242. Id. (“Any person under 18 years of age who violates any of the provisions of this
Charter for the violation of which no punishment has been provided herein, shall be punished
by a fine not exceeding one thousand ($1,000.00) dollars, and/or be required to perform
useful public service not to exceed 48 hours or any combination thereof.”).
243. Id.
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In 1992, in one of the only reported legal challenges to such
practices, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld direct-file municipal
court prosecutions against children in R.E.N. v. City of Colorado
Springs. 244 The court decided that the existence of a state juvenile
court system did not preclude non-protective municipal court
processing of youth. 245
Beyond this, relying on Colorado Home Rule standards, the
court also upheld the local municipal court’s decision to deny
accused youth the same protections and procedures provided in the
juvenile court system 246—including the right to counsel, social study,
and records expungement. 247 It found that “neither political entity is
encroaching on the regulatory sphere of the other” and both “can
establish the types of proceedings they deem appropriate, within
constitutional bounds, to prosecute juveniles in their jurisdiction.” 248
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER CONCERNS—CASE AGAINST
MINORS IN MUNIS
The problem with R.E.N. is that it treated children the same as
any other local legal issue—like zoning, littering, or speeding. But as
noted, in the nearly twenty-five years since R.E.N., the United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that kids are constitutionally
different from adults, and present a sui generis category for legal
analysis. Beyond this, state laws covering a variety of fields—not just
juvenile crime control—demonstrate special concern for the legal
treatment of youth.
Therefore, while adults surely have reason to protest municipal
court practices that provide assembly-line justice, deprive them of
court-appointed counsel, and imprison them for poverty, 249 children

244. R.E.N., 823 P.2d at 1361.
245. Id. at 1362.
246. Id. at 1363 (“Municipalities are not required to follow the Procedures in the
Children’s Code simply because the Children’s Code contains detailed and comprehensive
procedures for juvenile delinquency proceedings brought in state juvenile courts.”).
247. Id. at 1360–61 n.1.
248. Id. at 1363–64.
249. See supra Section II.B; see also ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S
NEW DEBTORS’ PRISONS 10 (2010) [hereinafter IN FOR A PENNY] (describing a “two-tiered
system of justice” where “the poorest defendants are punished more harshly than those with
means” in many local courts).
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have these and additional compelling grounds to challenge their
treatment in such systems. Unfortunately, children—especially while
unrepresented—neither know the basic legal protections to which
they are entitled, nor have the wherewithal to litigate complex state
law, federal law, and constitutional issues. 250 The next Section seeks
to shed light on the manifold constitutional, legal, and policy
concerns presented by the prosecution of minors in municipal courts
that to date have gone largely unnoticed and unchecked.
A. Stigmatizing and Traumatizing Vulnerable Youth
As noted, the growing practice in this country of prosecuting
and penalizing poverty has drawn sharp criticism from all corners. 251
Countless adult defendants have come forward in recent years to
share how such practices have not only wreaked havoc on their lives,
but also served to degrade and demoralize them in the courtroom
and the larger community. 252 And, of course, the United States
Department of Justice’s Ferguson Police Department investigation
confirms many such accounts. 253
The working poor recount enduring extraordinary hardship—in
addition to stress and shame—as a result of financial sanctions for

250. I further explore this dilemma in my article in progress, (Im)mobilizing Youth
(forthcoming). See also Annette Ruth Appell, Accommodating Childhood, 19 CARDOZO J.L. &
GENDER 715, 750 (2013) (acknowledging inherent vulnerabilities and disabilities of
childhood justifying special protections, while also calling for greater participatory rights
for youth).
251. See, e.g., Michael Pinard, Poor, Black and “Wanted”: Criminal Justice in Ferguson
and Baltimore, 58 HOW. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015); Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Local Courts
Reviving ‘Debtors’ Prison’ for Overdue Fines, Fees, FOX NEWS (Dec. 28, 2013),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/12/28/local-courts-reviving-debtors-prison-foroverdue-fines-fees/; Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Debtors’ Prisons: Thrive or Serve Jail Time?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/LatestNews-Wires/2013/0404/Debtors-prisons-Thrive-or-serve-jail-time.
252. Even late-night talk show comedians have highlighted the plight of such
individuals, including John Oliver with his coverage of Harriett Cleveland of Montgomery,
Alabama. See SPLC Client Featured on “Last Week Tonight” Segment on Debtors’ Prisons, S.
POVERTY L. CTR. (Mar. 22, 2015), http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/news/splcclient-featured-on-last-week-tonight-segment-on-debtors-prisons; see also KAREN DOLAN &
JODI L. CARR, THE POOR GET PRISON: THE ALARMING SPREAD OF THE CRIMINALIZATION
OF POVERTY (2015), http://www.ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/IPS-The-PoorGet-Prison-Final.pdf.
253. INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 7.
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low-level local ordinance violations. 254 For instance, a local judge
dressed down one Ohio mother by laughing at her as she cried in the
courtroom. 255 Across California, countless individuals live in fear of
public arrest because of their poverty. 256 And in St. Louis, on any
given evening, lines of black citizens waiting to see judges about
their cases have been seen streaming out of the municipal court
doors and down the street, often while seats remain empty in the
courtroom. 257 In the end, sometimes giving up hope of getting out
from under these pressures, many go underground hoping police
and warrants will not find them. 258
As horrifying as these stories are when told by grown adults, they
are far worse when shared by children. 259 But in some parts of the
country, youth, who are not old enough to hold a job, sign a lease,
or even vote, endure the same dehumanizing processes, indignities,
and pressures.
Without lawyers at their side or even a trusted adult to explain
the process to them, many young people attempt to make sense of
confusing legal documents, complicated agreement terms, and
ongoing requirements delivered from the bench. 260 But in the
jargon-filled, fast-moving world that is local municipal court practice,
it is hard to imagine how even the most mature child can knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily enter a guilty plea, forgo rights, and

254. See generally ACLU OF OHIO, THE OUTSKIRTS OF HOPE: HOW OHIO’S DEBTORS’
PRISONS ARE RUINING LIVES AND COSTING COMMUNITIES (Apr. 2013).
255. Id.
256. ALEX BENDER ET AL., NOT JUST A FERGUSON PROBLEM: HOW TRAFFIC COURTS
DRIVE INEQUALITY IN CALIFORNIA (2015), http://www.lccr.com/wp-content/uploads/
Not-Just-a-Ferguson-Problem-How-Traffic-Courts-Drive-Inequality-in-California-4.8.15.pdf.
257. Quinn, supra note 37, at 2204–05.
258. See Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, The Poor Are Paying the Price, NPR (May
23, 2014, 10:02 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-courtfees-punish-the-poor (“The result is that people face arrest and go underground to avoid
police. But this means they cut themselves off from job opportunities, welfare benefits or other
programs that could get them on their feet.”).
259. IN FOR A PENNY, supra note 249, at 46–47.
260. But even with an adult present, many such children make decisions without
understanding the gravity of the situation or reliable advice. For instance, one Texas mother,
“a hair stylist, didn’t have an attorney and Googled advice on how her daughter should plead”
at court. See Texas Turns Away from Criminal Truancy Courts for Students, supra note 236.
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accept the terms presented. Yet, in some jurisdictions, kids age
seventeen and younger are expected to do just that. 261
Advocates, teachers, and other youth allies see the unfortunate
results of these rushed courtroom arrangements. 262 Already at-risk
kids report they did not understand what was happening in court
and were too scared to speak up. 263 The practical effect—unpaid
fines, court fees, and then arrest warrants—is that such kids are
passed over for jobs, turned away from housing, and civilly disabled
in other ways as they try to become young adults. 264 And for many
youth, hopelessness and desperation may set in while operating
under the weight of these adult responsibilities. 265
More fundamentally, many of these municipal cases stem from
behaviors that are absolutely normal for teenagers. They do not
reflect deviance, violence, or propensity for harming others.266
Instead, ordinary adolescent actions such as making noise,
congregating in groups, or mouthing back to adults are frequently
deemed unlawful by expansive local ordinance code provisions. 267

261. See supra Section III.A. And here, again, it is clear that as a matter of law
seventeen-year-old children facing charges in municipal courts receive no specialized
consideration as a matter of law. Given the morass that is Missouri law, idiosyncrasies in local
practices, and a lack of publicly available data about youth processing in municipal courts, it is
not entirely clear what has been happening to fifteen- and sixteen-year-old defendants who face
charges, fail to appear, fall behind on fines, and the like. See supra Section III.A.
262. This author’s clinic has been repeatedly contacted by school teachers, social services
providers, counselors and others seeking assistance for youth dealing with municipal court
charges, fines, and warrants stemming from incidents when they were just seventeen years old.
Colleagues at the Colorado Juvenile Defender Center (CJDC) have similarly encountered
young people who have pleaded guilty in such courts without having a lawyer to assist them.
Zoe Schein, The Dangers of Municipal Courts for Youth, NAT’L JUV. JUST. NETWORK NEWS
CTR. (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.njjn.org/article/dangers-of-municipal-courts-for-youth.
263. See Wessler & Seville, supra note 216; see also BENDER ET AL., supra note 256, at 15
(recounting the story of “Joshua,” a homeless youth, who lives in fear of arrest for a warrant
relating to “lodging” on a public street overnight).
264. Wessler & Seville, supra note 216.
265. Id; see also Balko, supra note 8 (describing how youth in St. Louis are impacted by
municipal court practices).
266. Gerstein & Prescott, supra note 161 at 278–79 (noting that those convicted of
low-level quality of life charges usually are no danger to society—but have “merely offended
other people’s sensibilities”).
267. See, e.g., FLORISSANT, MO., MUN. CODE § 210.376 (providing that “[n]o person
shall loiter . . . at a time or manner not usual for a law abiding citizen” or “take[] flight” from
police); JENNINGS, MO., CITY CODE § 24.29 (defining disorderly conduct as, among other
things, using “insulting language” where a “breach of the peace may be occasioned”);
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Many of these provisions are fatally overbroad or improperly chill
First Amendment rights. 268 And even if constitutional, if presented in
a properly functioning juvenile court, such matters should be
handled informally or with warnings and dismissals. 269 Both
substantive law and court procedures in many municipalities fail to
account for adolescent development, brain science teachings, and
what most any mother or father will tell you—that kids will, and
should, be kids.
Therefore, as a matter of common sense, charging and
prosecuting juveniles under the age of eighteen with low-level
ordinance violations in this way is antithetical to the government’s
role in supporting youth. 270 They also run contrary to the most
recent holdings of the Supreme Court, acknowledging youth under
the age of eighteen as a vulnerable group in need of special
treatment by our courts. 271 Rather than protecting young people,
such localized practices—which might be seen as a form of in loco
juvenile justice—traumatize and reduce the life chances of some of
the country’s most vulnerable and already traumatized
young people. 272

UNIVERSITY CITY, MO., CODE § 215.385 (“It is unlawful for any person to fail or refuse to
obey a reasonable order or direction of a police officer.”); see also Kristin Henning,
Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communities of Color: The Role of Prosecutors in
Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 383, 395–97 (2013).
268. See, e.g., Peter W. Poulos, Chicago’s Ban on Gang Loitering: Making Sense of
Vagueness and Overbreadth in Loitering Laws, 83 CAL. L. REV. 379, 382 (1995); see also
INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 7, at 24–28.
269. See MODELS FOR CHANGE, supra note 34, at 104.
270. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (noting that its decisions rested
not only on common sense—on what “any parent knows”—but on science and social science
as well).
271. See supra Sections I.C. & I.D.
272. See ERICA J. ADAMS, HEALING INVISIBLE WOUNDS: WHY INVESTING IN TRAUMAINFORMED CARE FOR CHILDREN MAKES SENSE 3 (Just. Pol’y Inst. ed., 2010),
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/10-07_REP_HealingInvisibleWounds_JJPS.pdf (reporting that many economically challenged urban youth of color suffer trauma
through exposure to violence and other destabilizing factors in their communities); Trauma
Informed Systems of Care, NAT’L CTR. JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, http://www.ncjfcj.org/ourwork/trauma-informed-system-care (last visited Sept. 18, 2015) (“The juvenile justice system
needs to be trauma informed at all levels.”).
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B. Side-Stepping Federal Mandates
In many municipal courts around the country, prosecution
practices not only harm young people, but also conflict with federal
laws specifically intended to protect against harsh treatment of
juveniles. On the books for over forty years, the federal Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency and Prevention Act (JJDPA) was enacted to
help states improve their youth justice systems. 273 Known as one of
most important pieces of juvenile legislation in this country’s history,
its provisions seek to reduce harm to court involved kids. 274
Today, the JJDPA has several core components or goals that
states must satisfy to receive federal juvenile justice funding. The first
is deinstitutionalization of youthful “status offenders.” 275 The second
involves protective measures for youth in custody, including
separating them both physically and by “sight and sound” from adult
prisoners. 276 A third goal is reduction of juvenile “disproportionate
minority contact (DMC) with the justice system.” 277
Status offenses are defined as behaviors that are unlawful because
they are committed by youth. 278 Activities like underage drinking,
underage smoking, curfew violations, and truancy are common
examples of such charges where the child’s minor status is essential
to the charge. 279 Under the JJDPA, states should not respond to such
youthful indiscretions with arrest and placement in secure facilities—
juvenile detention centers or otherwise. 280 Instead, federal funding is
provided to support deinstitutionalization in such cases to avoid

273.
274.

42 U.S.C. § 5601 (2012).
Gary Gately, Will This Be the Year JJDPA is Reauthorized?, JUV. JUST. INFO.
EXCHANGE, (Sept. 4, 2014), http://jjie.org/will-this-be-the-year-jjdpa-is-reauthorized/
(noting that states that fail to comply with the components of the JJDPA are “really doing
harm to [juveniles] in the system”).
275. Compliance with the Core Requirements of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, http://www.ojjdp.gov/
compliance/index.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(11) (2012) (referring to “juveniles who are charged with
or who have committed an offense that would not be criminal if committed by an adult”).
279. Patricia J. Arthur & Regina Waugh, Status Offenses and the Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act: The Exception that Swallowed the Rule, 7 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST.
555, 555 (2009).
280. Id.
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unnecessary incarceration and harm to kids based on minor
adolescent misbehaviors. 281
Unfortunately, the practices in many jurisdictions appear to
frustrate the intention of these provisions. For instance, in Wyoming
the municipal ordinance violation of minor in possession of alcohol is
excluded from the state’s definition of status offenses. 282 In
Wyoming, not only are youth subject to secure detention for such
offenses—but may be prosecuted as adults in municipal courts and
sentenced to adult jail time. 283
In Missouri, the current morass of state Juvenile Code and local
Municipal Code provisions also appear to frustrate JJDPA’s goal of
deinstitutionalization of status offenders. For instance, the Juvenile
Code provides that juvenile courts have concurrent jurisdiction with
municipal courts for youthful curfew cases. 284 But it does not further
direct which entity has primary responsibility for these matters or
how they should be processed, prosecuted, or punished.
Some Missouri municipal codes expressly state that curfew cases
can be referred to juvenile court for processing. 285 Yet, interestingly,
some local curfew provisions apply to youth up to age eighteen.286
Related ambiguities and interpretation problems exist for underage
smoking, which is handled differently across different municipalities
in Missouri. On the face of their Ordinance Codes, places like
Ferguson appear to permit fines of up to $1000 and three months in
jail for any violator under the age of eighteen without any reference
to juveniles or juvenile court. 287
In fact, the very definition of “status offense” and to whom it
applies in Missouri is far from clear. In 2008, the Missouri legislature
sought to extend the coverage of juvenile court status offense
prosecutions to cover youth up to age eighteen, rather than just

281. Id. at 558.
282. John M. Burman, Juvenile Injustice in Wyoming, 4 WYO. L. REV. 669, 686–
87 (2004).
283. Id.
284. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.031.1(2)–(3).
285. See, e.g., JENNINGS, MO., MUN. ORDINANCE § 24-17.
286. See, e.g., id.; FERGUSON, MO., MUN. ORDINANCE § 29-91.
287. See FERGUSON, MO., MUN. ORDINANCE §§ 29-153(b), 29-155, 1-15. But see
FLORRISANT, MO., MUN. ORDINANCE § 210.500 (allowing for fines only, ranging from $50
for first offenses and up to $750 for subsequent incidents of underage smoking).
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seventeen. 288 However, the enabling legislation indicated such a
change would not occur until the legislature also provided funding
to support extending juvenile court jurisdiction. 289 To date, despite
repeated requests by our court system for funding, this has not
occurred. 290 Seventeen-year-olds remain in a kind of legislative limbo
in the Show Me State when it comes to status allegations.
Finally, while Missouri’s Juvenile Code expressly defines certain
acts as status offenses—like failing to attend school and running
away from home—any offense “not classified as criminal” is also
considered a status offense if committed by a child under the age of
eighteen. 291 As municipal proceedings are merely civil in nature, it
would seem that every municipal ordinance charge involving a minor
should be interpreted as a status offense, thereby precluding arrest
and secure detention in a jail or juvenile detention center under the
JJDPA. But this does not appear to be the case.
Jurisdictions may not be reporting such issues as violations of
JJDPA. They may claim that once state law provides exclusive or
concurrent jurisdiction to adult venues—like municipal courts—such
matters are no longer considered “juvenile” cases under the Act. 292
But such claims seem to place form over substance and thwart the

288. See MO. JUV. CODE § 211.021(2) (expanding definition of “child” to cover “any
person over seventeen but not yet eighteen years of age alleged to have committed a
status offense”).
289. See MO. JUV. CODE § 211.021(2) (Revisor’s note clarifies withholding effective
date of expanded definition of status offense until sufficient appropriations are made to
support the expansion); see also Mo. H.B. 1550 (2008).
290. MO. OFFICE OF ADMIN., 2015 MISSOURI JUDICIARY BUDGET REQUEST 5 (Sept.
20, 2013), https://oa.mo.gov/sites/default/files/Judiciary%20FY%202015%20Budget.pdf
(seeking over four-million dollars to implement HB 1550, which was signed into law seven
years earlier in 2008).
291. See Mo. Stat. Ann. §§ 211.021(2), (7), 211.031.1(2)(e). As noted earlier, the
legislature has specially carved out non-felony traffic offenses for those age fifteen to eighteen
as exclusively municipal matters, and provided concurrent jurisdiction between juvenile and
municipal court for certain curfew and tobacco violations. Mo. Stat. Ann. § 211.031.1(3).
But the Juvenile Code also suggests Juvenile Courts do not have jurisdiction over tobacco
cases. See Mo. Stat. Ann. § 211.031.1(2).
292. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, JUVENILES IN JAILS: THE DANGERS OF
INCARCERATING
YOUTH
IN
ADULT
JAILS
IN
AMERICA
5
(2007),
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/CFYJNR_JailingJuveniles.pdf
(describing the use in many states of a “loophole” in the JJDPA and its enabling regulations
that allows states to treat as adults any youth certified to criminal court or direct filed into
such institutions).
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spirit and intention of JJDPA’s deinstitutionalization mandate. It is
also notable that federal regulatory exclusions focus on the
distinction between juvenile and criminal court proceedings—
without offering much insight about municipal courts that might
hold themselves out as civil venues. 293
Similar issues can be seen in municipal management of arrested
youth—both in terms of separation requirements and DMC
reporting. The general rule is that juveniles may not be housed with
adults in jails and detention centers, even during temporary stays.
Instead, they must be protected by what has become known as
“sight and sound” separation. 294 But as described above, across the
country youth under eighteen may pass through local holding cells
and jails each year. And, particularly in smaller municipal police
departments and courthouses, physical facilities may not ensure
complete separation—and protection—of youth from adults. 295
More than this, some jurisdictions may be excluding traffic
arrests and other ordinance violation arrests from their JJDPA count
numbers. Here, too, they may claim that because municipal courts,
rather than juvenile courts, have original jurisdiction in such cases,
they are not “juvenile” matters for purposes of reporting
requirements. These same jurisdictions may be undercounting
youthful minority contact with the justice system, by excluding
traffic, and other municipal ordinance cases from annual reports
seeking to discern racial disparities in juvenile policing
and prosecution. 296

293. See Substantive Requirements, 28 CFR § 31.303 (2015). What is more, new
regulations providing greater clarity consistent with the original goals of the JJDPA appear to
be in progress. See Liz Ryan, Federal Juvenile Justice Regs: What’s the Hold Up?, CHRON. SOC.
CHANGE (Apr. 29, 2014), https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/opinion/federal-juvenilejustice-regs-whats-the-holdup/6422.
294. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5633(a)(12)–(13) (2012); see also 28 CFR § 31.303.
295. See, e.g., Gary Gately, Grassley OJJDP Probe Widens, Implicating 6 States, 2
Territories, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE (Mar. 4, 2015), http://jjie.org/grassley-ojjdp-probewidens-implicating-6-states-2-territories/ (raising questions about sight and sound compliance
in states like Idaho and Tennessee).
296. In fact, as this article goes to press, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention is revisiting its guidelines for statutory interpretation and compliance under the
JJDPA. For instance its facilities monitoring manual is currently being updated see, e.g.,
GUIDANCE
MANUAL
(2010),
http://www.ojjdp.gov/compliance/
OJJDP
guidancemanual2010.pdf/. In addition OJJDP Administrator Robert L. Listenbee issued a
policy statement reminding states that if requirements are not satisfied they may lose federal
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C. Displacing State Law through Local Adultification of Kids
Minors in municipal courts raise other significant legal concerns.
States may provide local municipal courts with jurisdiction in the
cases of some children in conflict with the law. But that does not
mean local governments can ignore the much-occupied fields of state
juvenile law and child welfare. Although some scholars have recently
proposed greater local influence over family affairs 297 and contested
the extent to which federal interests impact family law principles,298
the state has long stood as a central government agent in protecting
the rights and needs of children in this country. 299 Under this
traditional allocation of power, state norms and goals around child
treatment and welfare should trump in loco juvenile justice practices
that directly conflict with them or undermine their achievement.
1. Lack of power in special fields of child law and regulation
States differ in their approaches to delegation of “home rule”
authority. 300 In some jurisdictions, municipalities have “no inherent
powers” and may legislate locally only to the extent expressly
permitted by state law. 301 Thus, although a municipal court system
may have jurisdictional powers in some youthful offender matters, it

juvenile justice funds. See U.S. DEP’T JUST., OJJDP POLICY: MONITORING OF STATE
COMPLIANCE WITH THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ACT (2015),
http://www.ojjdp.gov/compliance/monitoring-state-compliance-JJDPA-policy.pdf
297. See, e.g., Sean H. Williams, Sex (and Money) in the City, 21 (U. of Tex. L., Pub. L.
Res., Paper No. 625, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2532589.
298. Laura A. Rosenbury, Federal Visions of Private Family Support, 67 VAND. L. REV.
1835, 1836 (2014); Courtney G. Joslin, Federalism and Family Status, 90 IND. L.J.
787 (2015).
299. See Joanna L. Grossman, Family Law’s Loose Canon, 93 TEX. L. REV. 681, 690
(2015) (book review) (“[I]t is still by and large true that family law and family status are
controlled by the states.”); see also Meredith Johnson Harbach, Is the Family a Federal
Question?, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 131, 134 (2009) (noting that historically family law has
been seen as a “quintessentially state issue”); Rosenbury, supra note 298, at 1836 (“The
individual states have long played a primary role in defining the legal family in the United
States, with states often determining who does and does not enjoy the legal status of spouse,
parent, and child.”).
300. See Williams, supra note 297, at 2 (discussing the distinction between generally less
empowered “legislative” and more empowered “imperio” home rule states).
301. See, e.g., Damon v. City of Kansas City, 419 S.W.3d 162, 183 (Mo. App. W.D.
2013) (“A city has no inherent powers, but is confined to those expressly delegated by the
state and those necessarily implied in the authority to carry out the delegated powers.”).
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does not necessarily follow that they have the authority to create
penalty or enforcement schemes in such cases. 302 And, even where
such authority may be implied from local jurisdictional powers,
municipal courts do not have carte blanche to prosecute and punish
as they wish. 303
Municipal court defendants are generally entitled to due process
and constitutional protections. 304 But municipalities must take
particular care when dealing with child defendants as a class of
litigants. Not only have children been deemed categorically less
culpable as a matter of Supreme Court constitutional law, 305 they
have long held a special place in state law and policy. 306
For instance, across the country state laws affirmatively require
parents to provide for their children, 307 schools to educate them,308
and police to protect them. 309 Entire administrative structures have
been constructed by most states to ensure maintenance of these
supportive features, as well as to intervene when they are not

302. See, e.g., Village of Depue Illinois v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 537 F.3d 775, 787 (7th
Cir. 2008) (holding that although municipality had the right to adopt certain provisions, it
could not apply or enforce them in a way that exceeded its authority).
303. See, e.g., Zilba v. City of Port Clinton, Ohio, 924 F. Supp. 2d 867, 885 (N.D. Ohio
2013) (stating that the power to regulate parking did not allow for creation of penalty scheme
inconsistent with state penalties for parking offenses); see also Ryals v. City of Englewood, 962
F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1251 (D. Colo. 2013).
304. See, e.g., Damon, 419 S.W.3d at 191 (holding that municipal court must provide
due process and other constitutional and statutory procedural protections to defendants).
305. See supra Sections I.C, I.D.
306. See generally State Child Welfare Policy Database, About Us, CASEY FAM. PROGRAMS
(2010), http://www.childwelfarepolicy.org/about_us (making “publicly available an array of
state child welfare policies so that policy makers, practitioners, and other stakeholders can stay
abreast of the policies that protect our nation’s most vulnerable children”).
307. See State Child Welfare Policy Database, Data by Topic, CASEY FAM. PROGRAMS
(2010), http://www.childwelfarepolicy.org/maps/single?id=137 (showing state by state
provisions on parental responsibilities).
308. See Paul L. Tractenberg, Education Provisions in State Constitutions (forthcoming
in STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY), http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecon/
subpapers/tractenberg.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2015).
309. See Theodore P. Cross et al., Police Involvement in Child Protection Services
Investigations, 10 CHILD MALTREATMENT 1, 2 (2005), http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/
CV83.pdf (“The nature of their mutual involvement in the same cases follows from CPS’s
mission to ensure children’s safety and well-being in caretaking relationships and law
enforcement’s mission to investigate crimes and protect the public safety.”).

1299

QUINN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

4/5/2016 2:13 PM

2015

functioning as they should. 310 Further, broad swaths of protective
legislation—from anti-child labor regulations, 311 to mandatory
reporting provisions, 312 to laws prohibiting contract enforcement
against minors 313—affirmatively set the stage for adult engagement
with young people in every state.
While state legislators may have allowed for municipalities to take
jurisdiction over some ordinance cases involving children—that is,
sharing the field with regard to who might accept such matters—
none appears to have expressly offered to share the fields of child
treatment and family protection. Nor did they likely intend to do so,
particularly in the manner we see happening in many of
today’s localities.
Yet municipal policing and prosecution practices that engage
children without consent of their guardians, take them out of their
family homes, disrupt their educational services, or seek to enforce
financial and contractual obligations surely encroach upon zones
intended to be maintained exclusively by the state to ensure the wellbeing of its children. In fact, despite its holding in R.E.N. over two
decades ago, the Colorado Supreme Court has recently struck down
municipal actions on state field preemption grounds based on these
very concerns.
In 2000, Juliana Ibarra was a Colorado foster mother for three
children, each of whom had been both the victims and perpetrators
of sexual abuse. 314 Despite their status as child victims, the youth
were adjudicated delinquent for their actions and required to register
under Colorado state law as sex offenders. 315 However, that same
310. See, e.g., Child Protective Services, N.Y. ST. OFF. CHILD. & FAM. SERV.,
http://www.ocfs.state.ny.us/main/cps/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2015); Child Protection Services,
CAL. DEP’T OF SOC. SERV. (2007), http://www.dss.cahwnet.gov/cdssweb/pg93.htm.
311. See Wage Hour Division (WHD): State Child Labor Laws Applicable to Agricultural
Employment, U.S. DEP’T LAB. (Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/
agriemp2.htm.
312. See State Child Welfare Policy Database, Persons Required to Report, CASEY FAM.
PROGRAMS (Apr. 2010), http://www.childwelfarepolicy.org/maps/single?id=160.
313. See, e.g., ILL. ST. B. ASS’N, KIDS AND THE LAW: AN A TO Z GUIDE FOR PARENTS 3
(2008), http://www.isba.org/sites/default/files/teachers/publications/Kids%20and%20the
%20Law.pdf (noting that children in Illinois do not have the ability to contract until they reach
age 18—or the age of majority).
314. City of Northglenn v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d 151, 153–54 (Colo. 2003).
315. Id. As explained by Ms. Ibarra, “These kids need protecting. They are not like
pedophiles. They were [sexually] violated before and they responded [by violating their
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year the city of Northglenn, where Juliana and her children lived,
passed Ordinance 1248. 316 According to youth advocates, the law
was an attempt to redefine “the term ‘family’ so as to exclude any
household that contains more than one individual who must register
as a sex offender.” 317 Thus, by allowing unrelated sex offenders to
live in her home, Ms. Ibarra allegedly violated local law. 318 She was
ultimately charged, prosecuted, and fined. 319
Ms. Ibarra appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court alleging,
among other things, that punishment under Ordinance 1248
amounted to an unfair infringement on “the right to personal choice
in matters of family life.” 320 That is, her foster family was “torn
apart” by the local law’s enforcement. 321 In holding that enforcement
of the Ordinance was implicitly preempted by the state’s
preeminence in the fields of family law and child welfare, the Court
noted that “Ordinance 1248 and the Children’s Code superficially
appear to regulate two different subject matters.” 322 However, as
applied, local law infringed on the state’s ability to meet its
obligations to youth. 323 The Court ultimately held that application of
Ordinance 1248 was “preempted because it regulate[d] a matter of
statewide concern: adjudicated delinquent children in state-created
foster care families.” 324
Although the issue before the Colorado Supreme Court related
to state-placed foster and delinquent youth, its analysis applies with
equal force to other matters of child welfare, family integrity, and the
legal status of juveniles. Indeed, the Court noted that “[t]he parens
patriae interests in the welfare of children have always been a matter
of state legislation.” 325 Thus, local laws applied in ways that implicate
siblings].” George Lane & Stacie Oulton, Sex Offender Rule Loses in Court, DENVER POST
(Mar. 20, 2001), http://extras.denverpost.com/news/news0320b.htm.
316. City of Northglenn, 62 P.3d at 153.
317. City of Northglenn v. Ibarra, ACLU OF COLO. (2012), http://aclu-co.org/courtcases/city-of-northglenn-v-ibarra/.
318. City of Northglenn, 62 P.3d at 154.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. See Lane & Oulton, supra note 315.
322. City of Northglenn, 62 P.3d at 160.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 163.
325. Id. at 162.
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child law matters which have been “traditionally and historically
regulated by the state” should be treated as implicitly preempted. 326
Even if not expressly so denoted, therefore, a state’s historic
commitment to the regulation of child treatment in the home and
society may be read as entirely preempting municipal court child
punishment practices that implicate these areas. 327 Any action beyond
taking jurisdiction may involve entry into fields of law and regulation
intended to remain under state control. 328
2. Specific conflicts with contract and other doctrines
Many municipal court practices also directly conflict with, or
affirmatively frustrate the goals of, state laws relating to children. As
noted above, under most state statutory and regulatory schemes,
youth are legally dependent upon their parents or guardians who
have the power to make a range of decisions about their lives. Even
the most basic determination of whether a child is permitted to take
a bus across town to visit a courthouse is one that, under state law,
begins with an assessment of the need for child autonomy under the
circumstances, the role of parent, and the significance of the
familial structure. 329
Therefore, taking children into custody by warrant without
parental notice or consent, making determinations that might impact
a child’s education, and even summoning a child before the bench
necessarily implicates state-constructed legal frameworks. 330 What is
326. Id. at 162–63.
327. Id.
328. See id. at 162 (“Although the Constitution assigns home-rule powers to
Northglenn . . . it does not specifically provide that Northglenn may regulate land-use in such
a manner that also regulates the number of adjudicated delinquent children living in foster
care homes.”).
329. See Sarah Swan, Home Rules, 64 DUKE L.J. 823, 824 (2015) (“The ability to
‘establish a home and bring up children’ is a fundamental part of the American dream.”)
(internal citation omitted); Annette R. Appell, The Child Question, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV.
1137, 1155 (2013) (“Children are, effectively, under coverture of their parents; this includes
management of their own spiritual and physical health and their freedom to choose their own
activities, labor, and education.”).
330. Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 833–34
(2007) (“[A]bsent abuse or other forms of perceived family default, parents enjoy almost
complete authority over their children at home.”). One exception to this general concept of
difference is a child’s independent right to counsel, regardless of the position of the guardian
or parent. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34–38 (1967); see also Kristin Henning, Juvenile Justice
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more, these practices simply disregard the legal deference generally
provided to families as units and legal protections afforded to youth
as vulnerable individuals. 331 Accordingly, they would appear to be
implicitly preempted by state law.
Another area of long-standing state-law child regulation relates
to privacy and confidentiality. Juvenile, family, and education law and
procedures have generally protected the identity of children from the
general public, particularly when the information in question may be
intimate or stigmatizing. 332 This is why juvenile courts are generally
closed to those who do not have a direct interest in the proceedings
and education records are not available to the general public like
other government records. 333
But as described above, many municipal courts subject children
to automatic public presentation and shaming by way of prosecution
of low-level ordinance violations. Even if not in direct contravention
of a particular statute, such practices may work to frustrate the spirit
and purposes of the various privacy-protecting provisions established
by the state on behalf of children.
Perhaps the most striking example of direct conflict can be seen
in municipal court financial sanction practices. As a matter of state
law, children are considered dependent upon the adults in their
lives. 334 Thus, there are affirmative restrictions on their ability to
after Graham v. Florida: Keeping Due Process, Autonomy, and Paternalism in Balance, 38
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 17, 18 (2012) (noting how modern juvenile law should evaluate
“protective rights that are necessary to ensure accurate fact-finding and prevent undue
coercion by the state” differently from “capacity-based rights that are arguably only
appropriate for youth who have sufficient capacity to exercise them”).
331. Id.; see also Appell, supra note 250 (exploring tension between child’s autonomy
versus role within family unit).
332. See generally RIYA SAHA SHAH, LAUREN FINE & JAMIE GULLEN, JUVENILE
RECORDS: A NATIONAL REVIEW OF STATE LAWS ON CONFIDENTIALITY, SEALING AND
EXPUNGEMENT
(2014),
http://juvenilerecords.jlc.org/juvenilerecords/documents/
publications/national-review.pdf; LISA LARSEN, MINN. H. RES. DEP’T, FEDERAL AND STATE
LAWS
GOVERNING
ACCESS
TO
STUDENT
RECORDS
(2000),
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/studrec.pdf.
333. SHAH ET AL., supra note 332; see also NAT’L ASS’N OF COUNS. FOR CHILD., POLICY
STATEMENT: CONFIDENTIALITY OF JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDINGS AND RECORDS 2 (1998),
http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.naccchildlaw.org/resource/resmgr/policy/policy_statement
_-_confident.pdf (advocating a case-by-case basis analysis of confidentiality in juvenile courts,
with the interest of the child serving as paramount consideration).
334. See, e.g., McNamara v. McNamara, 181 N.W.2d 206, 210 (Iowa 1970) (“[B]oth
parents are under the same legal duty to support their children.”); Morrison v. Richerson, 497
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enter into financially binding contracts. Youth under the age of
eighteen generally may not take out car loans or rent apartments.335
And adults who seek to enter into such an arrangement with a child,
under most state law schemes, do so at their own peril. 336 The
agreement will not be upheld; it will be voided as a matter of law. 337
Yet, in many places, municipal court judges allow children to
enter into agreements to pay fines, court fees, and other litigation
costs and then seek to enforce them through warrants, contempt
orders, threats of arrest, and even detention or incarceration. 338 This
practice stands in stark contrast to what is generally permitted under
state law contract frameworks constructed to protect children from
intimidation, overreaching, and financial liability during their
formative years. 339 It may well be that some features of these stateconstructed frameworks are not sufficiently nuanced and thus worth
revisiting in the days ahead. 340 But these are matters for state
legislatures and courts—not local municipal actors. In loco juvenile
justice is thus prohibited.
D. Denying Youth a Modern Constitutional Right to Juvenile Court
Finally, as described above, constitutional juvenile law is at an
important crossroads. Recent United States Supreme Court
pronouncements establishing the evolving standards of youth
standard suggest a fundamental shift in thinking about sentencing
children as adults. More than this, particularly when coupled with

N.W.2d 506, 506 (Mich. App. 1993) (noting that a child has right to financial support from
parent); In re Adoption of Marlene, 822 N.E.2d 714, 719 (Mass. 2005) (describing the
history of child dependence and duty of parental support in Massachusetts).
335. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Reading House. Auth., 8 F.3d 961, 966 (3d Cir.
1993) (youth unable to enter into lease with housing authority); Halbman v. Lemke, 99 Wis.
2d 241, 247–50 (1980) (finding a youth’s car contract voided).
336. Victoria Slade, Note, The Infancy Defense in the Modern Contract Age: A Useful
Vestige, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 613, 617 (2011) (“The [infancy] doctrine exists to protect
minors from foolishly squandering their wealth through improvident contracts with crafty
adults who would take advantage of them in the market place.”) (internal quotation and
citation omitted).
337. 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 9:5 (4th ed.).
338. See supra Part III.
339. See generally Slade, supra note 336.
340. Id. (noting calls by some contemporary commentators for softening of the infancy
defense in contract cases, particularly in light of youthful online behaviors and sophistication).
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the Supreme Court’s earlier cases providing basic protections for
juveniles facing juvenile court prosecution, these developments may
finally dictate a child’s constitutional right to juvenile court in the
first instance.
As noted, numerous challenges to the practice of “automatic”
criminal court prosecution of children were raised and litigated
during the 1970s and 1980s. And courts repeatedly held that there
was no presumption in favor of juvenile court prosecution. 341 States
were not required to establish juvenile court systems at all.
Therefore, legislatures could do as they pleased to create exclusions
and exceptions to juvenile court prosecution and treatment. 342 But
much has changed since the 1970s and 1980s. 343
At this point it is hard to imagine any state closing its juvenile
court system. If any tried to do so, it is difficult to believe such
action would go without massive resistance—followed by
maintenance of the system. In fact, standards have evolved over the
last few decades such that both public sentiment and constitutional
standards recognize children are inherently different from adults
and, in most cases, require different treatment. 344 While there may
not be an inherent right to be treated as a juvenile, the United States
Supreme Court appears to have now crafted one. 345

341. People v. Jiles, 251 N.E.2d 529, 531 (Ill. 1969) (“While there would probably be
almost universal agreement that it is desirable for a State to maintain a juvenile court . . . we
are aware of nothing in the constitution of the United States or of this State that requires a
State to do so.”); State v. Green, 544 P.2d 356, 361 (Kan. 1975) (“[T]he Kansas Legislature
could, in the exercise of its wisdom, withhold the protection of the doctrine of parens patriae
from all juveniles exceeding fifteen years of age.”); State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361, 1363 (Fl.
1980) (finding no inherent or constitutional right to be treated as a juvenile).
342. See, e.g., Woodard v. Wainright, 556 F.2d 781, 785 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[T]reatment
as a juvenile is not an inherent right but one granted by the state legislature, therefore the
legislature may restrict or qualify that right as it sees fit, as long as no arbitrary or
discriminatory classification is involved.”).
343. Kristen Simms Cross, When Juvenile Delinquents Are Treated as Adults: The
Constitutionality of Alabama’s Automatic Transfer Statute, 50 ALA. L. REV. 155, 174 (1998)
(recounting past unsuccessful challenges to direct filing practices, but forecasting different
results in future litigation).
344. See MARK W. LIPSEY ET AL., supra note 14, at 8 (reporting on overwhelming
popular support for early intervention, treatment, and rehabilitation of youth).
345. See Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida to Challenge Juvenile Transfer Laws, 71
LA. L. REV. 99, 137 (2010) (“Although the Graham Court passively accepts the
constitutionality of youth being tried as adults, the issue has never been properly brought
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That is, Roper, 346 Graham, 347 and Miller 348 all stand for the
proposition that youth under the age of eighteen, as a class, demand
unique analysis and consideration when compared with adults—
except in unusual circumstances. As argued by Elizabeth Scott, this
necessarily means that only in the rarest and most serious cases can
juveniles face adult prosecution, and only after an individualized
transfer hearing. 349 While not the focus of Professor Scott’s inquiry,
this same analysis should also prohibit automatic prosecution of lowlevel youthful indiscretions, like traffic offenses and ordinance
charges, in adult courts, including local municipal courts.
Indeed, in light of its recent decision in J.D.B. v. North Carolina,
it is obvious the Court intended for the evolving standards of youth
doctrine to apply beyond the sentencing context and to justice
system processing of young people more generally. 350 In J.D.B, the
Court held that under Miranda v. Arizona, courts needed to analyze
the question of “custody” from the perspective of the juvenile at the
time of police questioning. 351 That is, the Court in that context too
required specialized analysis and approaches for children in conflict
with the law.
As noted by juvenile advocate and expert Marsha Levick, “the
Court’s recognition of a reasonable juvenile for the purposes of the
Miranda custody analysis augurs a broad shift in the analysis of a
juvenile’s guilt, criminal responsibility, and conduct across a wide
spectrum of American criminal law.” 352 J.D.B., therefore, provides
further support for a claim that minors under age eighteen deserve
special treatment in case prosecution, with the default venue of first
resort being juvenile court.

before the Court, and lawyers should not disregard potential claims using the Eighth
Amendment.”) (internal citations omitted).
346. See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
347. See generally Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
348. See generally Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
349. See Scott, supra note 82, at 100–01.
350. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2399 (2011).
351. Id.
352. See also Marsha L. Levick & Elizabeth-Ann Tierney, The United States Supreme
Court Adopts a Reasonable Juvenile Standard in J.D.B. v. North Carolina for Purposes of the
Miranda Custody Analysis: Can a More Reasoned Justice System for Juveniles Be Far Behind?, 47
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 501, 503 (2012).
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Absent such a position, state juvenile justice systems that allow
for juveniles under the age of eighteen to be prosecuted and
punished in municipal courts, without any prior finding relating to
their special maturity, seriousness of their offense deserving adult
treatment, or lack of need for heightened protections, are simply
arbitrary. That is, beyond pushing youth in the lowest level cases into
adult court proceedings with no prior process, many municipalities
focused on increasing local finances actually deny youth the basic
Gault due process protections they would receive if prosecuted in
juvenile court—including the right to counsel.
And even where a particular part of a state justice system is not
required as a matter of substantive constitutional law, it must be
administered in a rational manner. 353 When a specially protected class
is denied such privileges or access, the deprivations must be even
more carefully scrutinized. 354 Thus irrationally denying certain
groups of minors access to treatment in our juvenile courts violates
both equal protection and due process principles. Looking at this
from a different angle, arbitrarily exposing certain youth to the
punitive features of an adult municipal court system runs afoul of the
constitution. 355 That is because state criminal justice and punishment
schemes must not be administered in a capricious or
haphazard fashion. 356
Thus, such indefensible in loco juvenile justice practices that fail
to account for youth under the age of eighteen as a special class, may

353. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 13 (1956) (noting that a state may not,
“consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment[,] . . . deny adequate appellate review to the poor while granting such review to
all others”); see also Mae C. Quinn, Reconceptualizing Competence: An Appeal, 66 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 259, 289 (2009) (“But the Supreme Court has held that once a state does confer
the right to appeal it must provide a system that is fundamentally fair and that provides for
‘adequate and effective’ review of a defendant’s claims.”).
354. See, e,g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). But
see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (declining to apply
suspect class analysis to children in educational rights setting).
355. Cf. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 84 (1992) (discussing how the Due Process
clause prohibits arbitrary state action, particularly when liberty is at stake).
356. See e.g., Ferman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (striking down Georgia’s
death penalty scheme for being “arbitrary and capricious”); Denmore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510,
551–52 (2003) (noting that “selecting a class of people for confinement on a categorical basis
and denying members of that class any chance to dispute the necessity of putting them away”
violates the Due Process Clause).
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provide further constitutional ammunition for demanding a right to
juvenile court as venue of first resort—at least in low-level municipal
offense cases. 357
V. CONCLUSION—JUVENILE COURT AS FIRST RESORT
We find ourselves in a historic moment. Constitutional juvenile
law now demands that juveniles—youth under the age of eighteen—
must be seen as a discreet class of people who deserve special
treatment in our justice system. The Supreme Court’s last four
decisions relating to juveniles and juvenile justice have laid the
groundwork for fundamentally rethinking of practices of the past,
not just for youth sentencing, but the ways in which we deal with
young people throughout the policing, processing, and
prosecution spectrum.
Similarly, events that have unfolded in Ferguson, Missouri have
surfaced previously overlooked problems of local municipal policing
and prosecution practices. This too has resulted in bold reassessment
of local justice systems. Assembly-line justice, deprivations of the
right to counsel, and punishment for poverty have all been called out
for the travesties that they are.
Taken together, these events cry out for a further related reform
effort—that is, removing minors from municipal court prosecutions
largely focused on enhancing local coffers, not child well-being.
Instead, juveniles should be directed to properly functioning youthcentered juvenile courts. And there they should not only receive the
protections provided under Gault, but should also be addressed like
the still developing children they are. 358
In this way, we can begin to put an end to in loco juvenile justice
practices and move towards a more coherent system in this country
for kids who are in conflict with the law—one where child-centered
juvenile courts are the venues of first resort for everyone under the
age of eighteen.

357. See also Appell, supra note 250, at 754 n.240 (calling for a constitutional
amendment to provide enhanced rights and protections for children).
358. Again, as discussed supra note 40, many of our nation’s juvenile courts are in
tremendous need of improvement too. However, it would seem to make the most sense to
engage in youth prosecution reforms under one roof—rather than in multiple state and local
venues spread out across a region.
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